论霍布斯公民服从与臣民自由难题的证成逻辑  

On the Logic of Hobbes’ Justification about the Liberty of Subjects and the Civil Obedience

作　　者：蒋小杰 JIANG Xiaojie

机构地区：[1]北京体育大学人文学院,100871

出　　处：《国外社会科学前沿》2021年第10期26-38,共13页JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目“权威与自由:霍布斯政治哲学研究”(2018T110012);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助课题“霍布斯政治义务理论研究”(2020031)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在证成公民对主权权威承担绝对服从义务的同时,霍布斯适当保留了公民的相对服从义务,意即承认他们还享有"真正的臣民自由"。然而,学界却普遍认为霍布斯此举使其理论陷入了逻辑不自洽的困境。通过对其绝对主权权威的有限性和自由的层次性进行辨析,可以发现,霍布斯所做的保留,事实上,始终与其对主权绝对权威的证成有着理论上的一致性。如果能够清晰地辨明霍布斯对自由的分层以及他的契约—授权理论,那么,我们就可以看出,霍布斯为现代社会自由的开拓预留特定空间之时,并没有从根本上破坏他对主权权威之绝对性的证成。Hobbes argues that citizens have an absolute obligation to obey under the authority of absolute sovereignty, but at the same time, he also makes appropriate reservations about citizens’ relative obligation to obey, which means to recognize the real liberty of subjects. By distinguishing the limitation of absolute sovereign authority and the hierarchy of freedom, Hobbes has sufficient theoretical consistency in his reservation of citizen’s duty of relative obedience, and always has theoretical consistency with his proof of absolute sovereign authority. If we can clearly distinguish Hobbes’ stratification of freedom and his contract-delegation theory, it can be seen that Hobbes did not fundamentally undermine his justification for the absoluteness of sovereign authority when he reserved specific space for the expansion of freedom in modern society.

关 键 词：霍布斯 主权国家 政治义务 政治哲学 道德哲学 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]