“参与治理”还是“选择治理”?——基于机构投资者与会计稳健性内生关系的检验  

"Participation in governance" or "selective governance"?——Based on the test of the endogenous relationship between institutional investors and accounting conservatism

作　　者：甄红线 凌方 景跃霞 ZHEN Hongxian;LING Fang;JING Yuexia(School of Accounting/China Internal Control Research Center,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;Kingdee Software(China)Co.,Ltd.Shenzhen 518000,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,大连116025 [2]金蝶软件(中国)有限公司,深圳518000

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2021年第9期2198-2217,共20页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA094);国家自然科学基金(72172029,71971046,71702025);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJA790115);全国文化名家暨“四个一批”人才项目。

摘　　要：针对当前中国机构投资者蓬勃发展的现状,以深沪两市2007年-2019年A股上市公司为样本,基于内生关系视角,实证研究了机构投资者持股与企业会计稳健性之间的关系.研究发现:1)机构投资者在企业治理中表现出"参与治理"和"选择治理"的双重作用,这揭示了机构投资者持股与会计稳健性之间是互为因果的动态关系;2)机构投资者的"参与治理"和"选择治理"作用均表现出"时滞性";3)无论是"参与治理"还是"选择治理",稳定型机构投资者比交易型机构投资者均表现出更强的治理效用,同时对持股企业会计稳健性的需求也更高.进一步探索发现:机构投资者持股对会计稳健性的影响存在"门槛效应",当其持股比例超过9.1%时,机构投资者持股对会计稳健性的正向影响显著下降,即机构投资者对企业的治理效应明显减弱.研究结论进一步拓展了机构投资者持股与企业会计稳健性的研究范畴,同时对相关监管部门引导机构投资者参与企业股权改革亦具有重要参考价值.In view of the current vigorous development of China’s institutional investors,we researched the relationship between institutional investors holdings and corporate accounting conservatism from the perspective of endogenous linkage.Using the sample of A-share listed firms of Shenzhen and Shanghai stock market from 2007 to 2019.We found that:1) Institutional investors exhibit the dual roles of participation in governance " and choose governance" in corporate governance,which reveals the dynamic relationship between institutional investor holdings and accounting conservatism;2) Institutional investors’ "participation in governance" and "choose governance" roles both show "time lag";3) Whether for "participation in governance" or "selective governance",stable institutional investors show stronger governance effect than transactional institutional investors,and at the same time,they have a stronger demand for accounting conservatism.Expanded research found that there is a "threshold effect" in the impact of institutional investors’ shareholding on accounting conservatism.That means if institutional investors’ shareholding ratio is above 9.1%,the positive impact of institutional investor’s shareholding on accounting conservatism decreases significantly,in other words,the governance effect of institutional investors on enterprises is obviously weakened.The conclusions of this article further expand the research framework between institutional investors’ shareholding and corporate accounting conservatism,and at the same time,they have important reference value for relevant authorities to guide institutional investors to participate in corporate equity reforms.

关 键 词：机构投资者 会计稳健性 内生关系 门槛效应 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]