零售商持股制造商减排投资的供应链协调优化研究  

Supply chain coordination optimization of retailer’s equity holdings in manufacturer’s carbon-reducing investment

作　　者：樊文平 王旭坪[1,2] 刘名武 付红 FAN Wenping;WANG Xuping;LIU Mingwu;FU Hong(Institute of Systems Engineering,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China;School of Business,Dalian University of Technology,Panjin 124221,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China;School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学系统工程研究所,大连116024 [2]大连理工大学商学院,盘锦124221 [3]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [4]合肥工业大学管理学院,合肥230009

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2021年第9期2316-2326,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72071028,71703122);重庆市科委基础与前沿研究项目(cstc2018jcyjAX0137)。

摘　　要：针对绿色产品的高生产成本及供应链企业间稳健性较弱的问题,结合消费者绿色偏好和低碳政策,在绿色供应链中实施持股策略,构建了制造商减排与否、零售商对减排投资持股与否等不同情景组合下的博弈模型,研究了纵向持股策略下企业的运营决策与协调优化问题.研究结果表明,持股策略使环保水平和企业经济效益同步提高,实现了供应链减排增效的双重红利;实施持股策略后,清洁型供应链中各企业的决策和利润优于污染型供应链对应企业;碳价格上涨时,污染型产品减排量降低,清洁型产品减排量增加,反之亦然;故政府可对市场中的碳价格适当干预,降低污染型企业碳价格而提高清洁型企业价格.进一步地,结合各企业在供应链中实际掌握的"话语权",运用混合策略讨价还价解实现了绿色供应链的协调与优化.Under the carbon trading policy and consumers’ low carbon preference,aiming at the high cost cracking problem of low carbon products and the weaker robustness between supply chain enterprises,the vertical shareholding strategy among enterprises was introduced into the low carbon supply chain.The decision-making and coordination optimization strategy of supply chain enterprises were explored under the circumstances of retailer’s shareholding in manufacturer’s emission reduction investment.The results show that the vertical shareholding strategy enables supply chain enterprise profits to meet the incentive compatibility constraints while achieving a reduction in product carbon emissions.We also find that when carbon price rises,the emission reductions of clean manufacturers increase,while the emission reductions of dirty manufacturers decrease,and vice versa.Therefore,to increase the emission reduction of enterprises,the government can properly regulate carbon prices,namely,increasing clean manufacturers’ carbon price and reducing dirty manufacturers’ price.After implementing the equity strategy,dirty manufacturers have lower optimal decision-making and profits than clean manufacturers.Therefore,from the perspective of long-term development,dirty manufacturers should transform to clean ones.Under conditions that the manufacturer decides whether to reduce emissions and the retailer decides whether to hold shares,combined with the "discourse power" actually possessed by the supply chain enterprises,the Nash bargaining mechanism was used to achieve supply chain coordination.Finally,the numerical experiments were used to verify the relevant conclusions and analyze the impact of the simultaneous changes in carbon prices and shareholding ratios on supply chain decision-making.

关 键 词：碳交易政策 减排成本 供应链鲁棒性 纵向持股策略 绿色供应链协调 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]