Bargaining strategy of oil companies in international oil and gas development Projects-Based on a bilateral bargaining model  

作　　者：Qing Xue Cheng Cheng Zhen Wang Ming-Ming Liu 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics and Management,China University of Petroleum,Beijing,102249,China [2]School of Management Science and Engineering,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan,030006,China

出　　处：《Petroleum Science》2021年第4期1270-1279,共10页石油科学（英文版）

基　　金：the financial support provided by the Humanities and Social Sciences Program of Chinese Ministry of Education(Grant Nos.19YJCZH106 and 20YJCZH201);National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71904111 and 71774105);Program for the Philosophy and Social Sciences Research of Higher Learning Institutions of Shanxi(Grant No.201803079,2nd[2018]of Jin Education)。

摘　　要：Bargaining between the host country and oil companies is very common to international oil and gas development projects.The existence of information asymmetry gives the host country an endogenous bargaining advantage.Foreign oil companies might change their unfavorable negotiating position by changing the order of bidding and adjusting bidding strategies.This paper introduces both factors into a bilateral bargaining model to study the impact of information asymmetry and bidding order on the strategy and equilibrium returns of oil companies.According to the ownership of the right to bid first,two scenarios are designed for the model to compare the equilibrium returns of the host country and oil companies.The results show that:1)There is a first-mover advantage in the process of bilateral bidding,so oil companies better bid first;2)The information asymmetry will lead to a higher nominal income ratio of oil companies and a lower nominal income ratio of the host country,but it doesn’t affect the total income ratio at all.

关 键 词：International oil and gas development PROJECT Information asymmetry Cooperation strategy Bilateral bidding model 

分 类 号：F416.22[经济管理—产业经济]