社会认知的知识优先进路  

Knowledge First Approach in Social Cognition

作　　者：王华平[1] WANG Huaping(Department of Philosophy,Shandong University,Jinan,Shandong,250100)

机构地区：[1]山东大学哲学与社会发展学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2021年第11期15-23,共9页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：山东省社科规划委托研究项目“生态哲学研究”(项目编号:16AWTJ01)。

摘　　要：在社会认知中,错误信念测试被认为是判别读心的"石蕊试纸"。而这预设了信念归与是基本的,是理解其他心理状态的基础。此种信念优先进路与新发现的经验证据越来越不匹配。有关非人灵长类动物和幼儿的社会认知研究表明,知识归与比信念归与更为基本。利用他人中心无知与自我中心无知现象,本文论证了,先于信念归与的知识归与的确是一种形式的读心,因而信念优先应该被修正为知识优先。不过,不能反过来认为信念归与依赖于知识归与。实际上,知识归与很可能是由单独的简单机制实现的,以帮助认知者向他人学习、预测他人的行动,以及归与他人信念。总之,知识归与为我们提供了一种理解读心的新方式,这种方式强调从心理状态与现实世界的联系去理解他心。In social cognition, passing a false belief test is regarded as the litmus test for having a capacity for mindreading. This position presupposes that belief attribution is basic in the sense that it forms the basis for understanding other mental states. But such a belief first approach becomes more and more odds with newfound empirical evidence. Research on the social cognition of non-human primates and infants shows that knowledge attribution is more basic than belief attribution. By appealing to the phenomena of altercentric ignorance and egocentric ignorance, this paper argues knowledge attribution, which is prior to belief attribution, is really a kind of mindreading, and thus the belief first approach ought to be replaced by the knowledge first approach. Nevertheless, it is wrong to think to the contrary that belief attribution depends on knowledge attribution. It is highly plausible that knowledge attribution is realized by a separate simple mechanism, so that it helps knowers to predict other’s actions, and helps them to learn from others and to attribute belief to others. This suggests a new way of understanding mindreading-one that is focused on understanding others’ minds in relation to the actual world.

关 键 词：信念归与 错误信念测试 知识归与 知识优先进路 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]