多维私人信息下的采购拍卖模型及最优投标策略  

Multidimensional Private Information Procurement Auction Model and Optimal Bidding Strategies

作　　者：高星[1] GAO Xing(School of Civil&Construction Engineering,Changzhou Institute of Technology,Changzhou 213032,China)

机构地区：[1]常州工学院土木建筑工程学院,江苏常州213032

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2021年第19期272-279,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：住房和城乡建设部科技计划项目(2017-K8-009);常州工学院校级科研基金项目(YN1413)。

摘　　要：从采购实践出发,考虑投标者的最低质量成本和质量增量成本两类成本类型,构建了多维私人信息下的采购拍卖模型;引入"效用价值"这一概念,使多维私人信息下的采购拍卖与标准拍卖在结构上具有一致性,给出了第一评分拍卖机制下的对称均衡投标策略;并进一步证明在多维私人信息的环境下,采用单一价格拍卖不仅降低了社会总福利,而且拍卖可能是帕累托无效.Based on procurement practice,multidimensional private information procurement auction model was built,in which bidder’s minimum quality cost and additional quality cost were considered.By applying the concept of utility valuation,multidimensional private information procurement auction has consistency with standard auction on the structure.Then,the symmetric bidding equilibrium strategies were provided on the first score auction.Finally,the results show that single price auction not only reduces the total social welfare,but also the auction may be Pareto invalid.

关 键 词：多属性拍卖 多维私人信息 效用价值 投标策略 

分 类 号：F713.359[经济管理—产业经济] F224F274