国际油田地面工程安全管理机制的进化博弈分析  

Analysis of evolutionary game theory in international oilfield surface engineering safety management

作　　者：徐海涛 汤迎文 杨祥祥 宋昌雨 单从云 XU Haitao;TANG Yingwen;YANG Xiangxiang;SONG Changyu;SHAN Congyun(CNPC Planning Department,Beijing 100101,China)

机构地区：[1]中国石油天然气集团有限公司发展计划部,北京100101

出　　处：《世界石油工业》2021年第5期20-23,共4页World Petroleum Industry

摘　　要：在国际油田地面工程项目建设过程中,监理失效是安全事故发生的重要因素之一。针对国际油田地面工程安全监理制度失效问题,用进化博弈论方法进行分析。结果表明,在将承包商和监理视为有限理性参与方的情况下,如同工程实际中普遍存在的情况,监理部分收入与业主收益正相关制度设计失效;同时,工程监理根据监理工作量额外获得收益时,监理选择执行监理职责的趋势加强。During the construction of international oilfield surface engineering projects,the failure of supervision is one of the important factors of safety accidents.The paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the failure of the safety supervision system of international oilfield surface engineering projects.The results show that when the supervising personnel and the contractor are deemed as bounded rational participants,design of the safety supervision system fails in the case of engineering practice which is positive correlation between part of the supervising personnel’s income and the owner’s income.At the same time,when the supervising personnel earn extra incomes considering their workload,there is a rising tendency that they are selectively performing their supervisory responsibility.

关 键 词：进化博弈论 油田地面工程 安全管理 稳定策略 

分 类 号：TE48[石油与天然气工程—油气田开发工程]