企业污染与政府监管之间的激励悖论  

The incentive paradox between corporate pollution and government regulation

作　　者：滕宇 Teng Yu(Shandong Technology and Business University,Yantai 264005,China)

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《皮革制作与环保科技》2021年第16期164-166,共3页Leather Manufacture and Environmental Technology

摘　　要：一项政策的出台与实施要制定对象辅助政策来为其查漏补缺。单一地激励或抑制政策在现行的国情下并不适用,并且,实施结果往往可能沿着与本来意愿相反的方向去发展,导致政策失灵。我国在现行环境治理问题上,往往会加大对环境破坏者的处罚力度。在短期来看这项政策是行之有效的,但从长期发展来看,这并不能从根本上来解决环境污染的问题,甚至会造成难以管控的情况出现。因此,政府在出台环境保护政策的同时,还应该对执法人员进行监督,提高其理性意识,预防不可控的情况出现。The introduction and implementation of a policy to establish the object of the auxiliary policy to fill the gaps. A single incentive or suppression policy is not applicable under the current national conditions, and the implementation results may often develop in the opposite direction to the original intention, leading to policy failure. In China’s current environmental governance problems, it is often to increase the punishment of environmental vandals. This policy is effective in the short term, but in the long term, it cannot fundamentally solve the problem of environmental pollution. It can even create situations that are difficult to control. Therefore, the government should not only introduce environmental protection policies, but also supervise law enforcement personnel, improve their rational awareness, and prevent uncontrollable situations.

关 键 词：激励悖论 政府监管 完全信息 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]