基于博弈和竞争谈判理论的最优核价策略研究--以某公司虚高或虚低原材料价格核价为例  

Research on the Best Cost Accounting Strategy Based on Competition and Game Theory

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作  者:马利[1] 韩九林 MA Li;HAN Jiu-lin(Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou,Zhejiang 310014;Huzhou University,Huzhou,Zhejiang 313000)

机构地区:[1]浙江工业大学,浙江杭州310014 [2]湖州师范学院,浙江湖州313000

出  处:《供应链管理》2021年第10期5-15,共11页SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

摘  要:科技的发展在提高人们生活水平的同时也促进自然朝更绿色、更环保的方向发展,PLA可降解环保餐具行业在顺应环保潮流下也进入了快速发展和激烈竞争阶段。基于此背景,文章基于经典的竞争理论并辅以先进的谈判博弈理论对某公司的成本核价方式进行了详细的分析和论证,在更进一步研究的基础上提出了:在完全竞争和完全信息下,制造商虚高原材料成本核价后和客户动态谈判博弈时不会有正收益。虚低原材料成本核价不会有负收益;在完全竞争和完全信息下,客户和虚高原材料成本核价策略的制造商动态谈判博弈时不会有负收益。客户和虚低原材料成本核价策略的制造商动态谈判博弈时不会有正收益。同时,文章创新提出的核价策略及谈判博弈模型为企业评估核价策略提供了参考。The development of science and technology is not only improving people s living quality,but also promoting environmentally-friendly development.In line with the environmental protection trend,the environmentally and biodegradable PLA plastic industry has entered the rapid development and fierce competition stage.Based on this background,the classical competition theory and the advanced negotiation and game theories were employed to analyze and explore a certain company s cost accounting model and make the following conclusions:under the condition of full competition and complete information,the cost accounting strategy that the raw material price is being falsely increased by manufacturer and/or supplier will not have positive payoff in the dynamic negotiation and games with customers,and will not have negative payoff when the raw material price is being falsely decreased by supplier.On the other hand,customers,under the full competition and complete information,will not have negative payoff when they negotiate and game with the manufacturer and/or supplier who adopts the cost accounting model that the raw material price is being falsely increased,and will not have positive payoff when the raw material price is being falsely decreased by supplier.Furthermore,the cost accounting strategy and game model innovatively proposed in this paper also provides a reference for enterprises to evaluate the payoff regarding their cost accounting strategy.

关 键 词:核价 谈判博弈 成本领先 

分 类 号:F252.3[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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