基于KMRW声誉模型的征信服务业支持绿色农业发展的博弈机理分析  

Analysis of Game Mechanism of Credit Investigation Service Industry Supporting the Development of Green Agriculture Based on KMRW Reputation Model

作　　者：彭平锋[1] 黎振强[1] PENG Pingfeng;LI Zhenqiang(School of Economics and Administration,Hunan Institute of Science and Technology,Yueyang 414006,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南理工学院经济与管理学院,湖南岳阳414006

出　　处：《湖南理工学院学报（自然科学版）》2021年第4期57-61,共5页Journal of Hunan Institute of Science and Technology(Natural Sciences)

基　　金：湖南省自然科学基金面上项目“洞庭湖生态经济区绿色农业的信用服务支持实证研究”(2019JJ40108)。

摘　　要：将农产品生产商的个人诚信纳入征信体系有利于绿色农业的发展.通过博弈论中KMRW声誉模型对绿色农产品生产者的选择行为进行分析发现,严重处罚并非应对失信的最佳策略,而应当针对其隐藏行为的做法进行管控,提高失信的机会成本.在有完善的征信体系的参与及助力下,声誉激励才会产生较为明显的作用,有助于推动绿色农业生产者诚信经营.In recent years, green agricultural products frequently appear in our daily life, also accompanied by some food safety problems. The personal integrity of agricultural producers in the credit system will be conducive to the development of green agriculture. The KMRW reputation model in game theory is used to analyze the choice behavior of green agricultural producers. It can be seen that severe punishment is not the best strategy to deal with dishonesty, but should be controlled for its hidden behavior to improve the opportunity cost of dishonesty. In this way, with the participation and assistance of the perfect credit investigation system, reputation incentive will play an obvious role in promoting the honest operation of green agricultural producers.

关 键 词：绿色农业 征信服务 KMRW声誉模型 

分 类 号：F326.5[经济管理—产业经济]