基于政企演化博弈的黄河流域中段水环境排污权交易分析  

Analysis of Water Environment Emission Trading in the Middle of Yellow River Basin Based on Evolutionary Game Between Government and Enterprises

作　　者：卢亚丽 翟露雨 李战国[2] LU Ya-li;ZHAI Lu-yu;LI Zhan-guo(School of Management and Economics,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou 450046,China;School of Information and Management Science,Henan Agricultural University,Zhengzhou 450046,China)

机构地区：[1]华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院,河南郑州450046 [2]河南农业大学信息与管理科学学院,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《水电能源科学》2021年第11期102-106,共5页Water Resources and Power

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71974056);河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划(2021-CX-005);华北水利水电大学研究生教育创新计划基金(YK2020-27)。

摘　　要：针对黄河流域水环境排污权交易问题,将政府和排污企业作为研究主体,构建二者基于排污权交易的演化博弈模型,分析了政府和排污企业策略选择的动态演化过程,探讨了企业减排成本、排污量、政府监督成本和压力成本等参数不同取值对系统16种不同情况下演化状态的影响,并以社会最优稳定策略(监督,技术减排)为例进行仿真研究。结果表明,仅在3种情况下满足系统稳定性只存在社会最优稳定策略(监督,技术减排);政府和排污企业初始概率的变化对双方演化影响作用相反;通过控制各参数取值可改变系统向期望状态演化速率。In view of the problem of emission rights trading in water environment of the Yellow River Basin,taking the government and the pollutant emission enterprises as the research subjects,this paper constructs the evolutionary game model based on the emission rights trading,and analyzes the dynamic evolution process of strategy selection of the government and the pollutant emission enterprises.The impact of different values of emission reduction cost,sewage discharge,government supervision cost and pressure cost on evolution states in 16 different cases of the system is discussed,and the social optimal stability strategy(supervision,technical emission reduction)is taken as an example for simulation research.The results show that the system stability satisfies only the social optimal stability strategy(supervision,technology emission reduction)in three cases.The change of initial probability of two parties’participation has the opposite effect on the evolution of both parties.The evolution rate of the system to the desired state can be changed by controlling the parameters.

关 键 词：黄河流域中段 水环境 排污权交易 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]