在相对与绝对之间——伯林和施特劳斯的比较研究  

Between Relativism and Absolutism—A Comparative Analysis of Berlin and Strauss

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作  者:黄梦晓 Huang Mengxiao

机构地区:[1]不详

出  处:《四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2021年第6期30-38,共9页Journal of Sichuan University:Philosophy and Social Science Edition

基  金:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(YJ2021142)。

摘  要:一般认为,20世纪两位著名的政治哲学家以赛亚·伯林和列奥·施特劳斯一个维护现代多元价值,一个推崇古典自然正当。但是人们也不应该忽视受20世纪共同时代背景的影响二人观点具有的某些相似性,主要体现在政治内在冲突、人类易错性和政治哲学的必要性三个方面。当然,二人还是选择了现代自然权利和古典自然正当两条不同道路:前者的依据是价值多元主义,自然权利体现在消极自由的概念中,最终在习俗和意见中走向真理的相对主义。后者的依据是苏格拉底怀疑主义,预设了习俗和意见之上的自然正当,并指向一种不断超越习俗和意见、矢志不渝追求真理的哲学生活。伯林为多元主义做出的辩护,仍然不能使他摆脱相对主义和绝对主义的两难困境,避免滑向相对主义的危险。It is generally believed that Isaiah Berlin and Leo Strauss,two famous political Philosophers in the 20th century,argue for modern plural values and classical natural correctness respectively.However,we shall not miss similarities between them that originated in a particular situation in which Cold War and the Second World War have shaped their ideas.More specifically,both of them are skeptic about universal ideas or one single comprehensive principle with which all different views on what is right can be hierarchically ordered in terms of priority.But what they find as a way that helps better avoid the kind of universalism or monism is different,particularly about“natural right”.Berlin goes with a value pluralism in which“natural right”is taken as an idea that goes well with his view of negative liberty,which ultimately justifies a relativistic view about the truth with convention and public opinion;while Strauss goes with a Socratic skepticism that presupposes a natural correctness regardless our awareness of its existence,which inherently refers to the need for the relentless pursuit of the truth.Berlin s defense of pluralism still cannot free him from the dilemma of relativism and absolutism,or avoid being accused of sliding into relativism.

关 键 词:自然正当 自然权利 价值多元主义 苏格拉底怀疑主义 相对主义 

分 类 号:D091[政治法律—政治学]

 

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