基于制造商技术创新水平的古诺与斯坦伯格博弈对比分析  

Comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg Model Based on Technology Innovation Capability of Manufacturers

作　　者：杨锋[1] 陈登辉 焦传亚 YANG Feng;CHEN Deng-hui;JIAO Chuan-ya(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第10期18-22,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71991464,71631006)。

摘　　要：研究了不同博弈模型下制造商产品策略的问题,建立并求解制造商在古诺博弈和斯坦伯格博弈下的模型。通过逆推法求解最优决策,进一步给出了两种博弈模型下的均衡解,并将结果加以对比,得出两种博弈模型对供应商的批发价格和利润、制造商的产品质量和利润的影响。研究表明:供应商的批发价格与博弈模型无关,只和市场规模有关;供应商的利润、制造商的产品质量和利润不仅与博弈模型相关还与制造商的技术创新水平有关。This paper investigates manufacturers’product strategies under different game models.Two game models marked Cournot game and Stackelberg game are developed and solved.Besides,an inverse method for solving the optimal decision is constructed,the method for solving the equilibrium in the two game models is given,and the results of the two game models are compared.We explore the influence of two game models on the wholesale price,profit of supplier,the product quality and profit of manufacturers.It is found that the wholesale price of supplier has nothing to do with the game models,only with the market size.It is also found that the profit of supplier as well as the product quality and profit of manufacturers are related not only to game models but also to the technology innovation capability of manufacturers.

关 键 词：技术创新 古诺博弈 斯坦伯格博弈 产品质量 

分 类 号：C931.1[经济管理—管理学]