基于博弈论的房屋检测利益主体行为影响研究  

Research on the Impact of Stakeholders’Behavior in Housing Inspection Based on Game Theory

作　　者：王琼 尤妙娜 李慧民[2] 龚建飞 WANG Qiong;YOU Miao-na;LI Hui-min;GONG Jian-fei(Zhanjiang University of Science and Technology,Zhanjiang 524059,China;Xi'an University of Architecture&Technology,Xi'an 710055,China)

机构地区：[1]湛江科技学院,广东湛江524059 [2]西安建筑科技大学,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2021年第5期53-58,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：湛江科技学院“品牌提升计划”工程管理特色专业(PPJH2021009);广东省大学生创新创业训练计划项目(2020CJXYDCYB55);广东省“十四五”规划高等教育研究项目(21GYB170);湛江市科技局非资助科技攻关项目(2020B01134).

摘　　要：房屋安全检测直接关系到相关主体的根本利益,相关主体存在着差异化的利益诉求,致使检测结果往往存在巨大争议,倘若处理不当,将会带来潜在社会危害。针对房屋安全检测过程中的争议问题,构建博弈模型,将博弈均衡结果归纳为业主“困局型”、开发商“侥幸型”、检测机构“寻租型”。研究结果表明,业主“困局型”行为取决于业主对房屋合格概率的正确估计;开发商“侥幸型”行为取决于开发商违规操作所支付的成本;检测机构“寻租型”行为取决于检测机构获得的非法收入和被检举揭发的概率。Housing safety test is directly related to the fundamental interests of the relevant stakeholders.These stakeholders havedifferent claims,which often leads to huge disputes regarding the test results.If not handled properly,it will incur potential socialdamages.In view of these controversial issues in the process of housing safety inspection,a game model is constructed,and the gameequilibrium results are summarized as"dilemma type"for owners,"lucky type"for developers,and"rent-seeking type"for testinginstitutions.The results show that the"dilemma type"behavior of owners depends on the correct estimation of the probability ofhousing qualification.The"fluke"behavior of the developer depends on the cost of the developer’s illegal operation.The rent-seekingbehavior of testing institutions depends on the illegal income obtained by testing institutions and the probability of being reported.

关 键 词：房屋检测 利益主体 博弈分析 违规操作 检举揭发 

分 类 号：TU746[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]