省域横向碳生态补偿的演化博弈分析  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Inter-Provincial Horizontal Carbon Ecological Compensation

作　　者：刘志华 徐军委 张彩虹[1] LIU Zhi-hua;XU Jun-wei;ZHANG Cai-hong(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Forestry University,Beijing 100083;School of Economics and Management,China University of Labor Relations,Beijing 100048)

机构地区：[1]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]中国劳动关系学院经济管理学院,北京100048

出　　处：《软科学》2021年第11期115-122,共8页Soft Science

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金项目(19GLB015)。

摘　　要：构建动态演化博弈模型,分析引入"约束激励"机制前后地方政府的博弈决策行为。结果表明:仅靠地方政府自身博弈无法实现最优策略选择,必须引入中央政府的约束激励机制;通过中央政府的约束激励机制实现最优均衡策略,中央政府对单方面履行或不履行义务的省份劳动关系与人力资源奖励和处罚金额之和应高于1609.27亿元,对单方面履行义务和均不履行义务的奖励和处罚之和应高于395.79亿元。This paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model to analyze the game decision-making behavior of local governments before and after the introduction of the"constraint incentive"mechanism.Results show that,the local government can't achieve the best strategy choice only by its own game,and the central government's constraint and incentive mechanism must be introduced.The sum of the rewards and penalties given by the central government to provinces that unilaterally perform or fail to perform their obligations should be higher than 160.927 billion yuan,and the sum of the rewards and penalties given to provinces that unilaterally perform their obligations or fail to perform their obligations should be higher than 39.579 billion yuan.

关 键 词：碳生态补偿 演化博弈 约束激励 

分 类 号：F124.5[经济管理—世界经济] X322[环境科学与工程—环境工程]