控制权转移与“卖方”老股东治理:谁阻碍了管理层留任  

Control transfer and“seller”old shareholder governance:Who hinders the retention of management?

作　　者：王艳 何竺虔 徐淑芳[3] 罗莉 Wang Yan;He Zhuqian;Xu Shufang;Luo Li(School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies;Research Center for Accounting and Economic Development,Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area;Business School,Central South University;School of Economics and Finance,South China University of Technology;Business Group Eight,Moore Global Accounting Firm)

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学会计学院、粤港澳大湾区会计与经济发展研究中心 [2]中南大学商学院 [3]华南理工大学经济与金融学院 [4]大华会计师事务所北京总部事业八部

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2021年第5期161-172,I0029,I0030,共14页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(21ZDA039)资助。

摘　　要：“IPO核准制”催生了区别于西方国家的上市公司控制权转移交易定价。本文以2000-2017年发生控制权转移的A股上市公司为样本,考察了目标公司市场选聘类核心管理层为规避因控制权转移带来的离职风险而与新控股股东合谋的策略、路径及留任后果。研究发现:(1)管理层的负向盈余管理行为会使扣除“壳价值”的控制权转移真实溢价下降,且扣除“壳价值”的控制权转移真实溢价越低,控制权转移后管理层留任的机率越高,该研究结论在考虑了遗漏变量和样本选择性偏误的内生性问题后依旧稳健。(2)扣除“壳价值”的控制权转移真实溢价在管理层的负向盈余管理行为与其自身留任之间具有完全中介作用,同时,由于“卖方”老股东保留了目标公司的少部分股权,在控制权转移后仍会以中小股东身份存续在企业中,控制权转移中的“合谋压价”中介效应会受到包含“卖方”老股东在内的非控股股东治理的反向调节。(3)目标公司控制权转移后,当由“卖方”老股东、机构投资者和股权制衡所形成的非控股股东治理机制好时,管理层通过负向盈余管理压低目标公司控制权转移价格进而实现留任的路径会不成立。本文的结论为规范上市公司控制权转移行为、形成优秀职业经理人保护机制、控制权转移后通过善用“卖方”老股东来完善公司治理和缓解代理冲突提供了经验证据,也为我国当前新《证券法》注册制改革提供一定的启示。The IPO approval system produced different pricing methods of control transfer transactions of listed companies from that in Western countries.Taking A-share listed companies with control transfer from year 2000 to 2017 as research sample,this pa-per investigates the retention strategy,path and consequence of the target company’s fairly selected core management who collude with the new controlling shareholder to avoid the taken over risk caused by control transfer.The research results in this paper are as follows.(1)The negative earnings manage-ment behavior of the management will reduce the real premium of control transfer after de-ducting the shell value.The lower the real premium of control transfer after deducting the shell value is,the higher the probability of management retention.(2)The real premium of control transfer after deducting the shell value plays a complete mediation role between the negative earnings management behavior of the management and their own reten-tion.At the same time,because the old shareholders of the seller retain a small part of the equity of the target company,they will still exist in the enterprise as medium and small shareholders after the control transfer.The mediation effect of collusion for price reduc-tion in the control transfer will be inversely moderated by the governance mechanisms of non-controlling shareholders including the old shareholders of the seller.(3)After the control transfer,when the governance mechanisms of non-controlling shareholders formed by the old shareholders of the seller,institutional investors and the check and balance of ownership is well,the path for the manage-ment to reduce the control transfer price of the target company through negative earnings management will collapse.Compared with the existing literature,this paper makes expansion in the following aspects.Firstly,in terms of research content,this paper takes into account the value of shareholders’equity contained in the transaction price of control rights and the impact of shell resou

关 键 词：控制权转移 盈余管理 控制权溢价 管理层留任 非控股股东治理 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271