基于博弈论的商业银行与小额贷款公司的合作分析  

Analysis of Cooperation between Commercial Banks and Microfinance Companies Based on Game Theory

作　　者：孙微 朱怀念[1] SUN Wei;ZHU Huai-nian(School of Economics and Commerce, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China)

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学经济与贸易学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《财经理论研究》2021年第6期52-59,共8页Journal of Finance and Economics Theory

基　　金：广州市哲学社会科学发展“十三五”规划2018年度课题(2018GZYB61)。

摘　　要：一般而言,中小微企业的贷款资金主要来自商业银行和小额贷款公司。现存商业银行资金雄厚,但是在小额贷款业务市场的触角不深;小额贷款公司在市场上的灵活性很强,但是缺乏贷款资金来源。本文基于博弈论视角分析商业银行与小额贷款公司的合作发展问题。首先,基于复制动态博弈分析了商业银行与小额贷款公司的竞合策略选择问题,得出二者在小额贷款业务市场最终发展方向为合作的结论。其次,对双方采取合作的模式问题展开了分析,假设商业银行与小额贷款公司均可以选择多元合作模式或单一合作模式,构建了以商业银行为领导者、小额贷款公司为追随者的斯坦伯格博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法得出了二者应采取多元合作模式的结论。最后,应用讨价还价模型分析了二者合作的收益分配问题,得出双方在利润分配谈判中更有耐心的一方最终获得更大收益的结论。Generally speaking,the loan funds of small-and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)mainly come from commercial banks and microfinance companies.The existing commercial banks have abundant funds,but they lack enough business in the microfinance market.Microfinance companies are very flexible in the market,but they lack sources of loan funds.In this paper,cooperation and development between commercial banks and microfinance companies are analyzed from the perspective of game theory.Firstly,based on replication dynamic game,the choice of competing strategies between commercial banks and microfinance companies is investigated,with the conclusion that the ultimate development direction of the two companies in the microfinance market is cooperation.Secondly,the mode of cooperation between the two sides is examined.It is assumed that both commercial banks and microfinance companies can choose multiple cooperation modes or a single cooperation mode.The Stackelberg game model with commercial banks as leaders and microfinance companies as followers is constructed.With backward induction,it is concluded that they should adopt multiple cooperation modes.Finally,the bargaining model is used to analyze the profit distribution of cooperation between the two parties,and it is concluded that the more patient party in the negotiation of profit distribution will eventually gain more profits.

关 键 词：商业银行 小额贷款公司 博弈 复制动态方程 斯坦伯格模型 讨价还价模型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]