事前环境规制还是事后污染治理?——基于地方政府“双重压力”的视角  

Environmental Regulation in Advance or Pollution Governance Afterwards?Based on the Perspective of“Dual Pressure”of Local Governments

作　　者：龚旻 钱津津 张帆 GONG Min;QIAN Jin-jin;ZHANG Fan(School of Finance,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410000,China;School of Finance and Taxation,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南工商大学财政金融学院,长沙410000 [2]浙江财经大学财政税务学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《云南财经大学学报》2021年第10期99-110,共12页Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：环境保护目标的实现有赖于地方政府环境政策的协调和配合。但在分权制财政体制下,内生的财政压力使财力受限地区只能与财力发达地区进行互补性财政竞争,其结果是财政压力较大地区放松环境规制,沦为"污染避难所"。而来自中央政府和民众的外生压力驱使污染企业密度大的地区加强环境治理强度。"先污染后治理"的地方环境策略空间上导致"环境马太效应",时间上具有短视性。据此,中央政府可设立向财力受限地区倾斜的专项转移支付,促使其具备足够的财政竞争能力,强化环境源头规制的激励。The realization of environmental protection goals depends on the coordination and cooperation of the environmental policies of local governments.However,under the decentralized fiscal system,endogenous fiscal pressure forces regions with restricted financial resources to engage in complementary fiscal competition with regions with developed financial resources.As a result,regions with greater fiscal pressure loosen environmental regulation and become"pollution refuges".In contrast,the exogenous pressure from the central government and the people drives the regions with a high density of polluting companies to strengthen the intensity of environmental governance.The local environmental strategy of"treatment after pollution"leads to the"environmental Matthew effect"spatially,which is short-sighted in terms of time.Therefore,the central government can set up special transfer payments that favor regions with limited financial resources,so that they can have sufficient financial competitiveness and pay more attention to environmental pollution regulation from the source.

关 键 词：财政压力 互补性财政竞争 “污染避难所” 外生压力 “先污染后治理” 

分 类 号：F810.7[经济管理—财政学]