粮补归农及其对粮食生产的影响  

Grain Subsidy Owned by Farmers and Its Effect on Grain Production

作　　者：李宏[1,2] 郑天佑 LI Hong;ZHENG Tianyou(Department of Management Engineering,Anhui Communications Vocational and Technical College,Hefei 230051,China;School of Economics,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽交通职业技术学院管理工程系,安徽合肥230051 [2]四川大学经济学院,四川成都610065

出　　处：《安徽科技学院学报》2021年第4期12-18,共7页Journal of Anhui Science and Technology University

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社科项目(SK2019A0925)。

摘　　要：目的:阐明粮食直补归承包户所有的原理及粮补归农对粮食生产的影响。方法:利用帕累托改进分析粮食直补归承包户所占有的原理,在此基础上构建一个三阶段动态博弈模型加以证明,并通过间接作用机制模型,分析粮补归农对粮食生产的不利影响。结果:政府采取“保留补贴”策略的得益为R-S-G/2,采取“转让补贴”策略的得益为R-S-G,R-S-G/2>R-S-G,因此政府采取“保留补贴”的策略。结论:粮食直补归承包户所有,不随农地流转;粮补归农最终降低粮食产量。Objective:To clarify why direct grain subsidies are owned by farmers and what impact of grain subsidies owned by farmers on grain production.Methods:Based on Pareto's improvement theory,a three-stage dynamic game model and the indirect action mechanism model are built to analyze the objective of the study.Results:Based on Pareto's improvement theory,a three-stage dynamic game model and the indirect action mechanism model are built to analyze the objective of the study.Conclusion:The direct grain subsidies are owned by farmers,not transferred with farmland,meanwhile the grain subsidies owned to farmers will eventually reduce grain production.

关 键 词：粮食直补 粮补归农 农地流转租金 动态博弈 帕累托改进 

分 类 号：F326[经济管理—产业经济]