两种交易模式下共享劳动力平台的定价策略  

Pricing strategies of laborer-sharing platform in two transaction modes

作　　者：管舒涵 盛健超 杜少甫[1] Guan Shuhan;Sheng Jianchao;Du Shaofu(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2021年第5期419-430,共12页JUSTC

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72071193,71631006,71921001).

摘　　要：随着互联网信息技术的快速发展,共享劳动力平台在促进社会人力资源的有效利用中起着关键性作用.目前市场上存在的共享劳动力平台有多种交易模式,且每种交易模式下的定价策略不同.在考虑劳动者的服务能力异质性后,分别构建了共享劳动力平台在买方定价策略和劳动者定价策略的利润函数,主要研究了劳动力平台在竞标模式下的最优定价策略.研究结果表明,当低类型劳动者提供的服务与买方的任务需求不匹配度接近高类型劳动者的时,劳动者定价策略对平台更有利,而当低类型劳动者的任务匹配度远低于高类型劳动者的时,平台的定价策略选择取决于买方对任务完成的满意程度.另外,还比较了计件模式与竞标模式,发现在劳动者定价策略下,平台在竞标模式下的利润并不总是优于计件模式.With the advancement of Internet information technology,the laborer-sharing platform plays a crucial role in promoting the full use of human resources across the whole society.At present,multiple trading modes with different pricing strategies are adopted by the laborer-sharing platform.Considering the heterogeneity of laborers’abilities,we construct the laborer-sharing platform’s profit functions under the buyer pricing strategy and laborer pricing strategy,and analyze its optimal pricing strategy in the bidding mode.First,our analysis shows that when the mismatch degree between the service of the low-type laborer and the buyer’s task is close to that of the high-type laborer,the laborer pricing strategy is beneficial to the platform.Second,when the task mismatch degree of the low-type laborer is much lower than that of the high-type laborer,the platform’s pricing strategy depends on the buyer’s satisfaction with the completing task.Finally,we compare two transaction models:the bidding mode and the piece mode,and find that under the laborer pricing strategy,the platform’s profit in the bidding mode is not always higher than that in the piece mode.

关 键 词：共享劳动力 竞标模式 计件模式 买方定价策略 劳动者定价策略 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]