公平偏好下基于投资者主导的流域生态补偿激励契约设计  

Design of Incentive Contract based on Investor-Led Watershed Ecological Compensation under Fairness Preference

作　　者：姜珂 强晨雪 JIANG Ke;QIANG Chen-xue

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学商学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2021年第10期77-88,共12页Scientific Decision Making

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(项目编号:71801135);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(项目编号:20YJC790050)。

摘　　要：十四五规划强调要进一步健全生态补偿机制,实现生态文明建设新进步。为促进流域生态补偿激励机制的进一步优化,基于个体公平偏好的视角,构建基于流域生态补偿投资者为主导的动态博弈模型,探讨生态系统服务提供者和投资者共同组成的激励契约优化设计问题。研究发现:相较于投资者无公平偏好的情形,在其具有公平偏好时,补偿双方的整体效用均随补偿系数的增加而有所降低;当流域生态补偿双方均具有公平偏好时,双方的整体效用会随着补偿成本补贴系数的增加而增加;流域生态补偿投资者的公平偏好是确保自身效用最大化的一种手段。The 14th Five-Year Plan lays stress on further perfecting ecological compensation mechanism and achieving new progress in the construction of ecological civilization.To optimize the incentive mechanism of watershed ecological compensation(WEC),a dynamic game model based on the investors of WEC from the perspective of individual fairness preference is established in this study,and the optimal design concerning the incentive contract composed of providers of the ecosystem service and investors is then discussed.The results show that the total utility of both parties will possess negative correlation with the compensation coefficient with the investors’fairness preferences,compared with the case that the investor without fairness preferences.Then,when both parties of WEC possess fairness preference,the overall utility will show a typical positive correlation with the subsidy coefficient of compensation cost.Finally,fairness preference of WECinvestor is considered to be a crucial mean to ensure their utility maximization.

关 键 词：流域生态补偿 公平偏好 参考点依赖 激励契约 

分 类 号：F062[经济管理—政治经济学]