四方演化博弈视角下的共享经济信用生成机理  

On the Generation Mechanism of Sharing Economy Credit From the Perspective of Four-Party Evolutionary Game

作　　者：汪茂泰 Wang Maotai(School of Humanities,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工程大学人文学院,安徽芜湖241000

出　　处：《黑河学院学报》2021年第10期49-52,共4页Journal of Heihe University

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社会科学研究项目“共享经济缺场交易风险及其信用治理研究”(SK2019A0107);安徽工程大学社科基金项目“共享经济‘缺场’交易及其治理研究:信用体系建设的视角”(2019yyrw01)。

摘　　要：构建政府—平台—供给者—消费者四方博弈模型,研究发现:短期内政府监管部门的严格监管是共享产品或服务的供给方和需求方选择守信策略、交易平台选择严格审核策略的重要前提;短期内交易平台的严格审核也是促使共享产品或服务的供给方和需求方选择守信策略的重要条件;长期供给方、需求方、交易平台方及政府监管部门的相互博弈会内生出信用关系。By constructing a four-party game model composing government-platform-supplier-consumer,the results show that:in the short term,the strict supervision of government regulatory departments is an important prerequisite for suppliers and demanders of shared products or services to choose trustworthy strategies and trading platforms to choose strict audit strategies;in the short term,the strict audit of trading platforms is also an important condition for suppliers and demanders of shared products or services to choose trustworthy strategies;in the long term,suppliers,demanders and trading platforms should choose trustworthy strategies.The mutual game between the supply party,the demand party,department will generate a credit relationship.

关 键 词：共享经济 交易信用 四方演化博弈 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济] F206