“双碳”目标引领下创新生态系统之联合体协同演化博弈  

Consortium Co-evolutionary Game of Innovation Ecosystem under the Guidance of“Dual-carbon”Goal

作　　者：何得雨 邹华[1] 杨宣虎 刘一丁 HE Deyu;ZOU Hua;YANG Xuanhu;LIU Yiding(School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China;Liaoning Branch of the Agricultural Development Bank of China, Shenyang 110013, China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110870 [2]中国农业发展银行辽宁省分行,辽宁沈阳110013

出　　处：《沈阳大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第6期636-644,共9页Journal of Shenyang University:Social Science

基　　金：宁夏回族自治区人民政府重大行政决策咨询研究重点课题(NX202109002);辽宁省教育厅科学研究项目(LJKR0076)。

摘　　要：运用演化博弈理论,对创新主体绿色技术创新稳定性及影响因素进行研究,进而为促进创新联合体的发展提供积极的建议。研究表明:惩罚成本、协同收益、政府补贴、技术吸收效益、碳税越高,主体与联合体双方越期望协同合作;超额收益、成本、政府碳补贴效益越高,双方越希望独自创新来获得更多的利润。认为双方应制定合理的成本分担比例,协同利益分配,以促进长期的协同创新。Using evolutionary game theory,this article studies the stability and influencing factors of the green technology of innovative subjects,so as to provide positive suggestions for promoting the development of innovative consortium.The research shows that:the higher the penalty cost,the synergistic benefits,the government subsidy and the benefits of technology absorption are the higher the carbon tax is,the more the subject and the consortium expect to cooperate;the higher the excess benefits,costs,and the benefits of government carbon subsidies,the more both parties hope to innovate independently.It believes that the subject and the consortium should establish a reasonable cost-sharing ratio and coordinate the distribution of benefits to promote long-term collaborative innovation.

关 键 词：创新主体 创新联合体 绿色技术 双碳目标 演化博弈 协同创新 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]