税收激励对企业现金股利支付水平的影响研究  被引量:4

Study on the Impact of Tax Incentive on the Level of Cash Dividend Payment of Enterprises

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作  者:时长洪 张琼琼 Shi Changhong;Zhang Qiongqiong(School of Management,Henan University of Science and Technology,Luoyang 471000,Henan,China)

机构地区:[1]河南科技大学管理学院,河南洛阳471000

出  处:《金融发展研究》2021年第11期21-28,共8页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘  要:近年来,我国宏观税收政策的不断发展为研究上市企业现金股利支付水平提供了全新的视角。本文以2007—2019年我国A股非金融类上市企业为样本,实证检验了税收激励对企业现金股利支付水平的影响及作用路径。研究发现,税收激励程度越高,企业支付的现金股利水平越高。基于作用路径检验发现,税收激励能够缓解企业面临的融资约束,使企业有动机、有能力去提高现金股利的支付水平。进一步研究表明,税收激励对企业现金股利支付水平的促进作用在市场化水平低的地区以及成长性低的企业更为显著。本文的研究对于理解税收激励的经济后果以及企业现金股利支付水平的影响因素具有重要意义,并为企业发放现金股利提供了政策建议。In recent years,the continuous development of China's macro tax policy has provided a new perspective for studying the cash dividend payment level of listed companies.Taking China's A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as the sample,this article empirically tests the impact of tax incentives on the level of corporate cash dividend payment and the paths of the two.The study found that the higher the degree of tax incentives,the higher the level of cash dividends paid by the company.Based on the function path test,it shows that tax incentives can alleviate the financing constraints faced by enterprises,and enable enterprises to have the motivation and ability to increase the payment level of cash dividends.Further research shows that tax incentives promote the level of corporate cash dividend payment more prominently in regions with low marketization and low-growth companies.This research is of great significance to understand the economic consequences of tax incentives and the influencing factors of the level of corporate cash dividend payment,and provides policy recommendations for companies to issue cash dividends.

关 键 词:税收激励 现金股利 融资约束 市场化水平 成长性 

分 类 号:F830.91[经济管理—金融学]

 

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