经济周期中的信贷引导:基于网络博弈的视角  

Credit Guidance in Economic Cycles:A Network Game Perspective

作　　者：赵墨非 徐翔[2] ZHAO Mofei;XU Xiang(School of Economics and Management,Beihang University;School of Economics,China Center for Internet Economy Research,Central University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,100191 [2]中央财经大学经济学院,中国互联网经济研究院,100081

出　　处：《经济研究》2021年第8期74-90,共17页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(18AZD007);北京高等学校卓越青年科学家计划(BJJWZYJH01201910034034);中央财经大学2020年度“青年英才”培养支持计划与第六批青年科研创新团队的资助。

摘　　要：本文从生产者网络出发,探讨经济周期中政府信贷引导行为的动机与利弊。在经济下行周期中,政府进行信贷引导的主要目的是抑制信用风险通过生产者网络传播,进而缓解其对于社会总产出的负面影响。这一行为对于不同经济部门的影响存在异质性:对于网络结构呈单向链式上下游关系的传统部门,信贷引导能够有效提高总产出水平,其实际效率与目标企业下游产业链的数量与长度有关;对于网络结构复杂的新兴经济部门如金融衍生品和互联网经济,信贷引导失效,会造成额外的总产出损失。当经济陷入严重衰退时,信贷引导同样弊大于利,对于关键节点企业的援助不足以弥补低效信贷带来的效率损失。此外,本文还拓展分析了通过信贷引导扶持关键高科技企业与保护国家经济安全的作用机制。基于理论推导与实例分析,本文建议,各级政府在进行信贷引导时应以最大化社会总产出为主要目标,充分考虑经济周期所处阶段、生产者网络结构、产业链长度、节点企业的网络连接数与技术外部性等因素。Credit guidance is a common policy practice for the governments of each country.Governments adopt credit guidance to sustain economic growth after the global financial crisis in 2008,and after the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in 2020.When the economy is in cyclical upswing,governments may also guide credit flows to develop certain industries and to secure macroeconomic safety.When credit guidance is adopted,governments may choose different firms in different sectors.When the economic cycle changes phases,the governments’credit guidance targets also change accordingly.This paper discusses the impact of credit guidance in different stages of economic cycles.Why is credit guidance barely seen when the economy is booming,and why is it frequently adopted when the economy is starting to go down?Why is credit guidance hardly seen when the economy is in recessions or even collapse?When credit guidance is adopted,why is most credit provided to traditional firms or even sectors with low production efficiencies,rather than emerging sectors like financial derivatives and internet economy?We build a theoretical model and analyze real policy cases to answer these questions.The network game model in this paper consists of one government,one state-owned bank and a number of heterogeneous firms.These heterogeneous firms form a credit network through unfulfilled product orders.They have different production efficiencies,and the economy has different degrees of prosperities.These two factors affect firms’ability to produce goods and deliver orders.If an order cannot be delivered as required,the productivity of firms in the downstream will be reduced,and the credit risk will spread through the network.In this model,the state-owned bank can make its own credit plan to distribute a fixed amount of credit resources,and the government can either approve the bank’s plan or issue administrative orders to assign a different credit plan.The bank’s goal is to maximize its own profits for each credit plan,while the government’s goal i

关 键 词：信贷引导 网络博弈 风险传染 政府与市场关系 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F224.32