控股股东股权质押与企业债权人利益保护——来自中国债券市场的证据  

Share Pledge of Controlling Shareholders and Protection of Corporate Creditors Interests:Evidence from China’s Bond Market

作　　者：史永东[1] 宋明勇[1] 李凤羽[1] 甄红线[2] SHI Yongdong;SONG Mingyong;LI Fengyu;ZHEN Hongxian(School of Applied Finance and Behavioral Science,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;School of Finance,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学应用金融与行为科学学院、应用金融研究中心和金融学院,116025 [2]东北财经大学会计学院和中国内部控制研究中心,116025

出　　处：《经济研究》2021年第8期109-126,共18页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71971046、71772030、71702025);国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA094);辽宁特聘教授滚动支持计划(辽教函[2018]35号);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(18YJA790115)的资助。

摘　　要：近年来,中国债券市场违约事件中暴露出的大股东侵害债权人利益现象引发了社会舆论和监管部门的高度关注,如何识别与防范此类行为、保护债权人利益已成为中国债券市场高质量发展亟需解决的关键问题。在此背景下,本文聚焦股权质押这一中国上市公司控股股东普遍采用的独特融资方式,探讨股权质押是否会引发控股股东侵害企业债权人利益行为以及防范机制。研究发现,控股股东股权质押显著提高了发债企业二级市场信用利差,这种现象在控制权转移风险较高的企业中表现更加明显。经济机制分析显示,股权质押潜在的控制权转移风险容易引发控股股东侵害企业债权人利益的机会主义行为,增加了债券持有人要求得到的信用风险补偿。最后,本文还发现,高质量的内部控制、分析师关注以及外部审计有助于缓解股权质押引发的控股股东侵害企业债权人利益行为。本文研究结论对于"刚性兑付"打破后如何保护债权人利益、促进债券市场高质量发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。At present,the phenomenon that major shareholders infringing on the corporate creditors’interests exposed in the default events of Chinese bond market has aroused great attention from the public and regulatory authorities.The infringement on corporate creditors’interests by large shareholders reflects the interest conflict between major shareholders and creditors.Under normal business conditions,the infringement on corporate creditors’interests by major shareholders will increase the future financing costs,and the balance between long-term and short-term control benefits will restrict major shareholders’opportunistic behaviors of infringing on creditors’interests to some extent.However,when the major shareholders are facing with control transfer risk,they may deviate from the balance between long-term and short-term control benefits,thus exacerbating or alleviating the interest conflict between major shareholders and creditors.In reality,how does control transfer risk affect the interest conflict between major shareholders and creditors?The existing literature does not give a clear answer.In recent years,the share pledge by controlling shareholders in China’s capital market has prevailed,and share pledge has become one of the most important financing methods for controlling shareholders of listed companies in China.The drastic fluctuations of China’s capital market make the controlling shareholders who implement equity pledge face high control transfer risk.Therefore,share pledge provides a rare research context for academics to explore how control transfer risk affects the interest conflict between controlling shareholders and creditors.Based on this,this paper takes the prevalent equity pledge of controlling shareholders in China’s capital market as the research subject,and studies whether the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will trigger the controlling shareholder’s opportunistic behavior that infringes on the interests of creditors,so as to provide a clear answer for how control tr

关 键 词：股权质押 信用利差 控股股东 债权人保护 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]