不完全契约下土地剩余权博弈与配置机制研究--以广州YH地块城市更新土地整备为例  

The Gaming of Land Residual Rights and Their Configuration Mechanism under Incomplete Contracting:A Case in Guangzhou

作　　者：何冬华 刘玉亭[1] 王秀梅[2] He Donghua;Liu Yuting;Wang Xiumei

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学建筑学院 [2]广州市城市规划勘测设计研究院规划设计一所 [3]广东省“三旧”改造协会土地整备委员会

出　　处：《规划师》2021年第17期68-73,85,共7页Planners

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(41771175)。

摘　　要：城市更新是多方建立契约关系的过程,本质是政府与原土地权属人和社会资本方建立的一种不完全契约关系,而政策规范的滞后则导致新的不完全契约关系的出现。基于不完全契约理论,文章以广州YH地块为例,分析城市更新过程中地块相关利益主体间的博弈冲突,并探讨土地整备剩余权的动态配置机制,结果发现,城市更新不确定领域中各方趋利避责,加大了交易成本;城市化带来的隐性增值往往会打破静态契约;政府作为隐性角色介入,基于理性工具、土地整备共同规划、协商谈判,重构契约内外剩余权。Urban renewal is a process of multi-stakeholder contracting,which is essentially an incomplete contracting between the government,original land owner,and social capital.In practice,incomplete policies and regulations have resulted in incomplete contracting.Based on incomplete contracting theory,the paper takes the YH land parcel in Guangzhou as an example,analyzes the gaming and conflicting among different stakeholders in the process of urban renewal,studies the dynamic configuration mechanism of land residual rights,and finds that:each stakeholder has sought to maximize his benefits and minimize his responsibilities due to the uncertainties of urban renewal,which has increased the transaction costs;added land value brought by urbanization will break existing contracts;the government shall intervene with rational tools such as land reorganization planning to restructure residual rights beyond contracting through negotiation.

关 键 词：城市更新 不完全契约理论 土地整备剩余权 交易成本 广州 

分 类 号：TU984[建筑科学—城市规划与设计]