企业公司治理、金融市场化与股价崩盘风险研究  

Corporate Governance,Financial Marketization and Stock Price Crash Risk

作　　者：苏坤 孟源 SU Kun;MENG Yuan

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院会计系 [2]中国财政科学研究院研究生院

出　　处：《金融监管研究》2021年第8期98-114,共17页Financial Regulation Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71773088,72172127);西北工业大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于我国沪、深两市A股上市公司的数据,从企业内部微观治理和外部宏观环境视角出发,系统研究了终极所有权、金融市场化对股价崩盘风险的影响效应,得出如下研究结论:一是终极控制股东现金流权越高、两权分离度越低,则代理成本与信息不透明度越低,公司股价崩盘风险越小;二是所处地区金融市场化水平越高,公司股价崩盘风险越低;三是金融市场化在终极所有权与股价崩盘风险的影响关系中具有负向调节效应,较高的金融市场化水平能够有效发挥外部治理作用,削弱了两权分离度对公司股价崩盘风险的影响。本文丰富并拓展了对终极所有权、金融市场化与股价崩盘风险影响因素的相关研究,对我国公司治理发展、金融体制改革以及金融风险防范具有重要启示意义。Using data of A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges,this paper studies the effects of ultimate ownership and financial marketization on stock price crash risk from the perspective of internal microscopic governance and external institutional environment.The results show that both ultimate ownership and financial marketization affect stock price crash risk.The higher ultimate controlling of shareholder's cash flow right is,the less divergence between voting right and cash flow right is,the lower agency cost and information opacity are,and the lower company's stock price crash risk is.Stock price crash risk of companies located in regions with higher degree of financial marketization is lower.Further research finds that financial marketization has a negative moderate effect on the relationship between ultimate ownership and stock price crash risk,which means a high level of regional financial marketization can play an external governance role and weaken the influence of ultimate shareholder's separation of the two rights on stock price crash risk.This article enriches and expands studies on economic consequences of ultimate ownership,financial marketization and influencing factors of stock price crash risk.We may make some contribution to corporate governance development,financial system reform and financial risk prevention in China.

关 键 词：终极所有权 金融市场化 股价崩盘风险 代理成本 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]