地方环境规制竞争、企业行为与可持续发展  

Local Environmental Regulation Competition,Corporate Behavior and Sustainable Development

作　　者：战岐林[1] 苏卉 穆秀珍[1] ZHAN Qi-lin;SU Hui;MU Xiu-zhen(Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai 264005,China)

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院经济学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《山东工商学院学报》2021年第6期22-33,42,共13页Journal of Shandong Technology and Business University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“基于国内增加值率的中国出口质量效益提升策略研究”(17CJL035)。

摘　　要：文章选取2004-2017年中国大陆29个省级地区的面板数据,构建随机效应的空间杜宾模型,检验了地区环境规制竞争、公众参与和企业区位选择行为之间的关系。结果表明,企业的区位选择,与该地区的环境规制竞争程度正相关,与该地区的公众参与程度负相关。如果没有公众参与的矫正,地区间环境规制竞争存在逐底趋势,虽然短期内能吸引更多投资,但不利于长期的可持续发展。根据研究结论,文章建议推动环境规制从污染的末端治理向事前预防转变;健全环境信息披露机制,引导公众参与环境规制;建议地方政府保持环境规制政策长期稳定,完善公众参与反馈机制,推行地方政府环境税率与公众参协同。The article seeks to carry out the empirical study to interpret the relationship between local environmental regulation competition,public participation and firm behavior(location selection)and economic sustainable development through a random-effects spatial Durbin model with 29 provincial panel data in China from year 2004 to 2017.The results show that a more intensified local environmental regulation competition can attract more investment,but will harm economic sustainable development.Active public participation can effectively avoid the excessive investment caused by local environmental regulation competition and sustain economic development.It is believed a sound environmental regulation system is radical,precautionary and beneficial to economic sustainable development.The information disclosure mechanism secures public participation into the environmental policy scheme and implementation.The coordination between local government’s environmental regulations and public participation is conducive to economic sustainable development.

关 键 词：环境规制竞争 公众参与 企业区位选择 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济] F279.27