面向环境规制强度变化的产业应对策略选择研究  

Study on the Choice of Industry Coping Strategies Facing the Change of Environmental Regulation Intensity

作　　者：王树强[1] 李盈 WANG Shuqiang;LI Ying(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学经济管理学院,天津300401

出　　处：《生态经济》2021年第12期54-60,共7页Ecological Economy

基　　金：天津科技计划项目重点招标项目“科技支撑天津环境与生态改善战略研究”(17ZLDZF00130);河北省高等学校人文社会科学研究项目“京津冀大气污染排放权初始分配机制及我省对策研究”(SD171046)。

摘　　要：基于排污权交易制度背景下,论文应用主导跟随型双寡头竞争结构的完全信息静态博弈模型,解析了产业面对不同环境规制强度的应对策略。研究发现:环境规制促进产业污染治理技术投资,且随着环境规制强度的增大,对治污技术投资的促进效果逐渐增强;环境规制与产品供给量之间呈现先下降后上升的“U”型关系;面对较小力度的环境规制,产业策略选择是减少产量,但随着环境规制强度的增大,产业增加治污投资的动机增强且逐渐放缓减产速度,达到一定环境规制强度时,产业同时增加治污投资和产品供应量。Based on the background of the emission trading system,this paper applies the complete information static game model of the dominant-following duopoly competition structure to analyze the industry’s coping strategies in the face of different environmental regulatory intensities.The study found that:environmental regulation promotes investment in industrial pollution control technology,and as the intensity of environmental regulation increases,the effect of promoting investment in pollution control technology is gradually enhanced;the U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and product supply that decreases first and then rises;In the face of smaller environmental regulations,the industry’s strategic choice is to reduce output.However,with the increase in the intensity of environmental regulations,the industry’s motivation to increase pollution control investment has increased and the rate of production reduction has gradually slowed down.When the intensity of environmental regulations is reached,the industry will increase pollution control investment and product supply at the same time.

关 键 词：环境规制 排污权交易 寡头垄断 产业行为 仿真模拟 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学] F062.9