从质疑说明排除论证出发为心理说明辩护  

Defending Mental Explanation from Doubting Explanatory Exclusion

作　　者：李铖 LI Cheng(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2021年第6期53-59,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

摘　　要：依照说明排除论证,人理解的行为只需借助机械论说明,而排斥心理说明。说明排除论证成立的关键有二:说明实在论;科学说明的统一性与简单性。说明实在论是科学说明的形而上学立场,主张:每个说明背后都有形而上学决定关系与之一一对应。科学说明的统一性与简单性表明每种形而上学的决定关系只能采取一种说明。但经分析可得:说明与形而上学的决定关系并不是一一对应的;统一性与简单性这一评估说明的标准存在问题。故而,说明排除论证是不成功的,人们有理由支持心理说明。According to explanatory exclusion,people’s behavior can only be explained by mechanism while the mental explanation should be excluded.There are two key points of the establishment of explanatory exclusion:explanatory realism,the unification and simplification of scientific explanation.Explanatory realism is a metaphysical view of scientific explanation,which claims that a metaphysical determinate relation corresponds to an explanation by one-on-one correspondence.The unification and simplification show that there is only one explanation for each metaphysical determinate relation.However,the analysis shows that the relationship between explanation and metaphysical determinate relation is not one-on-one correspondence,and there are problems in unification and simplification.Therefore,explanatory exclusion is not successful,and people have reasons to support mental explanation.

关 键 词：排除论证 心理说明 说明实在论 说明非实在论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]