政府购买养老服务的三方动态博弈研究  

Research on Three-party Dynamic Game of Government Purchase of Elderly-care Services

作　　者：胡扬名[1] 武颖君 HU Yang-ming;WU Ying-jun

机构地区：[1]湖南农业大学公共管理与法学学院 [2]中共冷水江市委党校

出　　处：《经济论坛》2021年第12期54-61,共8页Economic Forum

基　　金：湖南省社科基金重点项目(17ZDB011)。

摘　　要：从政府购买养老服务的三方利益主体——政府、养老机构以及老年群体之间的行为特征与博弈关系入手,通过构建三方动态博弈模型,分析得到实现三方均衡的条件,即政府购买养老服务绩效最优的前提。经实证研究可知:政府部门的监督行为与其监督成本、双向激励机制、民众信任度相关,养老机构的行为选择与其作为成本、政府的激励手段、自身美誉度相关,老年人的行为方案与政府的监督行为、养老服务的供给质量、自身的获得感相关。对此,应努力提高政府监督的效率、加大对养老机构的支持力度、确保养老服务的质量以及强化服务对象在绩效评估中的反馈作用,以促进普惠性养老服务绩效的优化。Starting from the behavior characteristics and game relationship among the three stakeholders in government purchase of elderly-care services,the government,the elderly-care institutions and the elderly groups,this paper analyzes the conditions for realizing the tripartite equilibrium by constructing the tripartite dynamic game model,that is,the premise of the optimal performance of government purchase of elderly-care services.Empirical research shows that the supervision behavior of government departments is related to its supervision cost,two-way incentive mechanism and people trust,the behavior choice of elderly-care institutions is related to its cost,government incentive means,its own reputation,and the behavior plan of the elderly is related to the supervision behavior of the government,the supply quality of elderly-care services and their own sense of acquisition.Therefore,the government should strive to improve the efficiency of government supervision,increase the support for elderly-care institutions,ensure the quality of elderly-care services and strengthen the feedback role of service objects in performance evaluation,so as to promote the optimization of inclusive elderly-care service performance.

关 键 词：政府购买 养老服务 三方动态博弈 

分 类 号：D669.6[政治法律—政治学]