交叉持股、共同股东与竞争企业合谋  

Cross-shareholding,Common Ownership and Collusion between Competing Enterprises

作　　者：于左[1] 张容嘉 付红艳[1] YU Zuo;ZHANG Rongjia;FU Hongyan(Center for Industrial and Business Organization,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,116025 [2]清华大学公共管理学院,100084

出　　处：《经济研究》2021年第10期172-188,共17页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“中国产业转型升级的轨迹和理论创新研究”(18JD790002);教育部人文社会科学研究项目“知识产权滥用行为对创新的影响与政府监管:以专利主张实体为例”(17YJC790034)的资助。

摘　　要：随着竞争企业间存在交叉持股、共同股东的现象不断增加,其是否会促使企业合谋、损害竞争引发了关注和争论。本文首先构建理论模型探讨了交叉持股、共同股东对竞争企业合谋的影响。研究发现,无论竞争企业间相互持有股权,抑或是存在共同股东,投资者持有目标企业所有权或控制权份额越大,合谋越容易达成。其次对滴滴出行和Uber的并购进行了案例研究,发现滴滴出行和Uber存在股权关系后,出现了涉嫌合谋的行为,主要表现在滴滴出行和Uber涉嫌划分全球市场,各自在相关市场具有市场支配地位,并涉嫌实施垄断高价。最后本文提出了完善反垄断立法及执法的建议。Cross-shareholding and common ownership are two forms of minority shareholding among enterprises,and collectively referred to as partial ownership.The existing studies have examined the effects of cross-shareholding and common ownership on collusion among competing enterprises separately.One view is that the presence of cross-shareholding or common ownership encourages competing enterprises to collude and reduce competition.The other view is that the influence of cross-shareholding or common ownership on collusion is not clear and needs to be further discussed.Cross-shareholding or common ownership promote competing enterprises to reach collusion contracts mainly by participating in board elections and changing executive compensation structure.We extend the existing theoretical research by introducing the control right factor into the theoretical model of cross-shareholding and common ownership to study the influence of ownership and control right change on corporate collusion.It is found that no matter competing enterprises hold shares of each other or they have common shareholders,the larger the share of ownership or control right of the target enterprise is held by the investor,the easier the collusion is to be achieved.This is because of the direct(cross-shareholdings)or indirect(common ownership)interest relation between competing enterprises due to partial ownership.In the case of cross-shareholding among competing enterprises,the actual profit of the enterprise comes from its own profit sharing and profit sharing from competitors.The existence of control right makes the enterprise not only pursue the maximization of its own profit,but also fully consider the possible negative externalities of its decision to competitors.When there are common ownership among competing enterprises,common shareholders pursue the maximization of their portfolio profits and intervene in the business decisions of enterprises by appointing directors,forcing enterprises to not merely pursue the maximization of their own profits,an

关 键 词：交叉持股 共同股东 合谋 反竞争效应 反垄断 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济] F571F271