上市公司关联交易的回应型规制  

Responsive Regulation of Related-Party Transactions by Listed Corporations

作　　者：曾思 Zeng Si

机构地区：[1]香港中文大学

出　　处：《中外法学》2021年第6期1599-1618,共20页Peking University Law Journal

基　　金：中华人民共和国香港特别行政区研究资助局杰出青年学者计划资助(项目编号:CUHK24613819)。

摘　　要：上市公司控股股东通过关联交易进行利益输送是我国资本市场的顽疾,而以市场自治为导向的公司法的私人执行模式难以有效规制利益输送行为。我国近年来发展了公司法的公共执行模式,允许监管机构通过不同方式强化对关联交易的规制。但实证研究表明,这些规制数量有限,对于资本市场上普遍的利益输送行为规制仍有不足。回应型规制理论表明,在公共规制者存在信息、资源约束的情况下,应当将规制权力授予多个主体,丰富执法手段,构筑执法金字塔,同时采取适当的规制升级策略。这一理论对于关联交易的有效规制有重要意义。One of the major problems facing China’s securities market is that the majority shareholders of listed companies often tunnel profits out of the company through related-party transactions.Private enforcement based on market-oriented company law does not effectively regulate tunneling.China has recently developed several public enforcement measures.However,there are relatively few enforcement actions against listed corporations.The theory of responsive regulation suggests that as the public regulators face fiscal and informational constraints,China should adopt more regulatory measures to build up an enforcement pyramid.It should also consider delegating the tasks of regulation to multiple parties and adopt the strategy of regulation in response to the behavior of listed corporations.The theoretical and empirical analysis offered in this article is likely to contribute to effective regulation of tunneling.

关 键 词：关联交易 持股行权 公司法的公共执行 回应型规制 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]