出口退税会给农业供给侧结构性改革带来逆向选择行为吗——来自虚假贸易的经验证据  

Will Export Tax Rebate Lead to Adverse Selection Behavior in Supply-side Structural Reform——Evidence from False International Trade of Chinese Agriculture Sector

作　　者：刘舜佳[1] 徐新龙 LIU Shunjia;XU Xinlong(Business School,Hunan Agriculture University,Changsha,Hunan,410128;College of Tourism,Hunan Normal University,Changsha,Hunan,410081)

机构地区：[1]湖南农业大学商学院,湖南长沙410128 [2]湖南师范大学旅游学院,湖南长沙410081

出　　处：《国际商务（对外经济贸易大学学报）》2021年第6期18-33,共16页INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国农产品出口贸易包容性增长研究”(19BJY170)。

摘　　要：本文从WITS数据库截取2002—2016年6分位编码的农产品贸易数据,研究2009年我国出口退税政策调整是否给农业供给侧结构性改革带来虚假出口这一逆向选择行为。基于双重差分模型的检验显示:出口退税率提高与农产品虚假出口构成因果关系,即使控制多维固定效应和平行时间趋势、伪造退税时间节点和退税品种、更换控制组、考虑进口逃税之后亦如此;与拉丁美洲和加勒比、撒哈拉以南地区以及与中高收入国家达成的出口协议较易发生出口骗税;13%比15%的出口退税率更易引发出口骗税,政策时滞效应为三年。Under the policy adjustment of the export tax rebate in 2009,this paper explored the adverse selection effect in supply-side structural reform in international trade of the Chinese agriculture sector. It employed the Difference-in-difference model to examine the causal relationship between the export tax rebate and false international trade based on the WITS database. The results demonstrate that the export tax rebate has a significant positive effect on false international trade. To ensure the result is robust,we consider alternating the research methods such as controlling fixed effect and parallel trend,period,product,and control group. To further analyze the internal causalities,we find that the tax fraud behaviors are more likely to occur in the international trade partners,including Latin America,the Caribbean,Sub-Saharan Africa,upper-middle-imcome countries. We also confirm that the export tax rebate rate of 13% is more likely to cause export tax fraud behavior than that of 15%. This behavior will last for three years after the policy of export tax rebate is issued.

关 键 词：出口退税 虚假贸易 双重差分 

分 类 号：F752.1[经济管理—国际贸易]