农村垃圾处理PPP项目三方演化博弈分析  

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Rural Waste Treatment PPP Project

作　　者：周镇浩 王艳伟[1] ZHOU Zhenhao;WANG Yanwei(College of Civil Engineering,Yunnan Agricultural University,Kunming 650201,China)

机构地区：[1]云南农业大学建筑工程学院,云南昆明650201

出　　处：《昆明理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2021年第6期132-143,共12页Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Natural Science)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(16XJC630009);云南省应用基础研究项目(2018FB111);云南省应用基础农业联合专项项目(2017FG001(-029))。

摘　　要：为充分研究农村垃圾处理设施PPP项目运营过程中政府、社会资本方、公众的策略选择,以及对其影响因素进行分析,使用基于演化博弈模型和matlab仿真模拟相结合的方法开展农村垃圾处理PPP项目三方博弈研究.首先,在假定博弈三方都具有有限理性的前提下,构建三方演化博弈模型,对三方主体策略选择及系统稳定性进行分析;其次,将所选定的因素通过matlab软件对博弈系统稳定性的影响进行仿真模拟分析;最后,根据仿真结果提出促进农村垃圾处理PPP项目有效运营的对策建议.研究结果表明:1)三方主体的策略选择受多个因素的影响,例如政府对社会资本方的补贴力度、政府对社会资本方采取投机行为的处罚力度以及政府对公众参与监督的奖励力度;2)在三方博弈过程中,采取政府选择积极监管、社会资本方采取积极行为、公众积极参与监督等措施,有助于博弈系统达到稳定状态;3)政府监管、公众参与监督是项目成功的关键,合理的惩罚措施可以有效降低社会资本方采取投机行为的意愿,同时合理的奖励措施也可以有效提高公众参与监管的意愿.In order to fully study the strategic choices of the government,social capital and the public during the operation of rural waste treatment PPP projects,and analyze their influencing factors,we carry out this research on rural waste treatment PPP projects tripartite game based on the combination of evolutionary game model and matlab simulation.First,under the premise that all three parties in the game have bounded rationality,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the strategy choice and system stability of the three parties.Secondly,simulation analysis of the influence of the selected factors on the stability of the game system is carried out by matlab software.Finally,based on the simulation results,countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to promote the effective operation of rural garbage treatment PPP projects.The research results show that:1)The strategic choice of the tripartite entities is affected by many factors,such as the government’s subsidies to the social capital,the government’s penalties for speculative behaviors on the social capital,and the government’s incentives for public participation in supervision;2)In the process of the tripartite game,taking measures such as government selection and active supervision,social capital parties’active behavior,and public participation in supervision will help the game system achieve a stable state;3)Government supervision and public participation in supervision are the key to the success of the project.Reasonable punitive measures can effectively reduce the willingness of social capital to take speculative behavior,and reasonable incentive measures can also effectively increase the public’s willingness to participate in supervision.

关 键 词：PPP项目 演化博弈 仿真模拟 系统稳定性 农村垃圾处理 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济] X799.3[环境科学与工程—环境工程]