《反垄断法》转售价格维持条款现阶段应维持现状--评《中华人民共和国反垄断法(修正草案)》第17条第二款  

The RPM Provision of China’s Antimonopoly Law Shall Maintain the Status Quo at Present:Comments on Article 17(2)of China’s Antimonopoly Law(Amendment Bill)

作　　者：兰磊[1] Lan Lei

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学知识产权学院

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2021年第6期5-33,共29页Competition Policy Research

摘　　要：我国理论与实务界就《反垄断法》第14条转售价格维持(RPM)条款的解释存在争议。作为回应,《中华人民共和国反垄断法(修正草案)》第17条第二款拟将RPM条款修改为采纳可反驳的竞争损害推定模式。这是一种接近于本身违法的严厉分析模式,严重干预企业的经营自主权。市场经济依赖企业的经营自主权来实现有效的资源配置。根据市场经济的基本逻辑,政府应该对干预措施提供正当理由,并须确保满足比例原则。然而,《反垄断法》修订过程中一直不曾提及如此修改的理由。国内学者对于推定RPM损害竞争的主张提出了多种支持理由,包括RPM导致涨价、损害消费者选择权益、损害竞争、损害经销创新、域外经验、国内现实状况、秩序自由主义、行为反托拉斯理论、合理原则高昂的制度成本等。分析表明这些理由均不能有效支持推定RPM损害竞争。新的经济学共识认为,RPM具有反竞争和促进竞争的双重效果。在此新共识以及美国丽锦案的影响下,全球出现了RPM规制态度趋缓的明显趋势。《反垄断法》现行RPM条款具有足够的解释弹性,我国原本走在全球RPM分析模式的发展趋势和探索实践前沿,修正草案拟采取的严厉模式不但有悖这一全球趋势,而且与我国当前的促进产业和需求双升级的经济政策相抵触,与我国大力发展知识产权事业的政策相冲突,并导致垄断协议框架出现内部冲突。《反垄断法》应保持足够的解释弹性和探索空间,不应在认识不足且缺乏有效支持理由的情形下贸然对行为违法性作出明确的定论。处理RPM问题的正确路径应该是,明确承认RPM适用合理原则分析,并根据RPM发生反竞争效果的常见机制发展恰当的结构型合理原则分析模式。但在现阶段学术界对RPM还缺乏深入研究和基本共识,维持《反垄断法》RPM现有条款不变是最佳选择。The interpretation of the resale price maintenance(RPM)provision stipulated in Article 14 of China’s Antimonopoly Law is controversial among China’s academic and practice circles.In response,Article 17(2)of China’s Antimonopoly Law(Amendment Bill)contemplates amending the RPM provision as adopting a rebuttable presumption of competitive harm.This mode of analysis is a harsh one akin to the per se illegality rule,seriously injuring the business autonomy of fi rms.The market economy relies on fi rms’business autonomy to effectively allocate resources.According to the fundamental logic of the market economy system,the government shall supply justifi cations for their interventions in market and ensure that such interventions satisfy the principle of proportionality.However,during the amendment process of Antimonopoly Law,rationales for this amendment have never been publicly mentioned.Chinese scholars supplied various rationales for the presumption of RPM harming competition,including RPM causing price increase,RPM injuring consumers’interests of making choices,RPM harming competition,RPM harming distribution innovation,overseas experiences,domestic circumstances,ordoliberalism,behavioral antitrust literature,and huge institutional costs of rule of reason.In-depth analysis shows that none of these rationales may effectively support the presumption of RPM harming competition.The new economics consensus on RPM opines that RPMs may have both anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.Under the influence of this new consensus and the U.S.Leegin case,a world-wide obvious trend of relaxing RPM regulation emerges.The existent RPM provision of Antimonopoly Law is sufficiently flexible,and China has been at the forefront of the word-wide RPM deregulation trend and exploration of suitable modes of analysis.The harsh mode of analysis contemplated by the Amendment Bill for RPM contradicts this global trend,as well as contradicts China’s present economic policy of promoting upgrades in industry and consumption,and Ch

关 键 词：反垄断法 分析模式 垄断协议 转售价格维持 合理原则 本身违法原则 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]