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作 者:冉翠玲[1] RAN Cui-ling(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出 处:《科技和产业》2021年第12期143-149,共7页Science Technology and Industry
基 金:国家自然科学基金(71171134)。
摘 要:从制度设计的角度论证电动车企业研发行为与政府补贴的关系。以电动车企业研发行为为例将回报共享制度应用其中,建立基于成本补贴的回报共享制度模型,推导出电动车企业在有无成本补贴情况下的个体效用最大下的最优研发努力水平。研究表明,具有成本补贴的回报共享制度下的个体企业研发努力水平要高于单纯的回报共享制度下的个体研发努力水平。此时调整研发成本补贴系数能够实现改进的回报共享制度下的个体企业研发努力水平最优值与群体收益最大的努力水平最优值相等。The relationship between R&D behavior and subsidy is demonstrated from the perspective of institution design.Return sharing institution is used to the R&D behavior of electric vehicle in perspective of institution design.By establishing an improved model of return sharing institution based on cost subsidy,the optimal point of R&D effort level of electric vehicle enterprises is deduced under the individual utility maximum with or without cost subsidy.The research shows that the optimal point of the R&D effort level of individual enterprise under the return sharing institution with cost subsidy is higher than that under the simple return sharing institution.By adjusting the coefficient of R&D cost subsidy,the optimal value of R&D effort level of individual utility maximum under the improved return sharing institution can be equal to the optimal value of the group utility maximum.
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