多方博弈情景下政产学研绿色技术创新联盟稳定性研究  

Research on the Stability of Green Technology Innovation Alliance for Government-industry-university Based on Multi-player Game

作　　者：陈恒[1] 杨志 祁凯[2] CHEN Heng;YANG Zhi;QI Kai(School of Economics and Management,Harbin Engineering University,Harbin 150001,China;School of Management,Harbin Normal University,Harbin 150025,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]哈尔滨师范大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150025

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2021年第12期108-114,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(21YJC630106);黑龙江省博士后科研启动基金项目(LBH-Q19114);科技战略先导计划项目(20zlxd2521010010101)。

摘　　要：互联网时代,为破解“环境污染—经济发展”的怪圈,开展产学研绿色技术创新战略联盟已经受到国内外学者、企业家的广泛关注。鉴于此,本文基于演化博弈理论,构建了政府引导、企业和学研机构参与下的绿色技术创新联盟三方演化博弈模型,分析了政府—企业—学研机构在动态环境中联盟主体行为策略演化规律以及影响联盟稳定性的关键因素,最后通过数值仿真分析论证了模型的有效性。研究结果表明:政府参与产学研绿色技术创新联盟能够有效的促使系统演化至稳定状态,而其激励力度与联盟稳定性呈正相关;政产学研在联盟契约框架下制定合理违约成本能够有效避免联盟主体的机会主义行为;企业与学研机构之间存在动态的联盟成本分摊比例与绿色创新收益分配比例。To solve the cycle of“environmental pollution-economic development”,these scientific questions that the government-university-industry alliance can facilitate the green innovation activities have been widely concerned by scholars and entrepreneurs at home and abroad.In this paper,based on evolutionary game theory,the tripartite evolutionary game model of government-enterprise-university is established to study the stability of green technology innovation alliance.Under the dynamic environment,we analyze the evolution law of government-industry-university in the process of interest game,and find key factors that affect the stability of green technology innovation alliance.Finally,the effectiveness of the model is demonstrated by numerical simulation analysis.The research results show that the government participation can effectively promote the system to optimal state in the green technology innovation alliance.The intensity of government incentives has a positive correlation with the stability of the green technology innovation alliance.At the same time,the government-industry-university should formulate reasonable default costs under the framework of the alliance contract,which can effectively avoid the opportunistic behavior of alliance members.What’s more,industry groups and university groups have an optimal distribution ratio of R&D costs and green innovation benefits in the alliance.

关 键 词：演化博弈 政产学研 绿色技术创新联盟 稳定性 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]