中国环境治理绩效的微观政治基础--基于地方干部激励制度与行为的分析  

Micropolitical Basis of Environmental Governance Performance in China:Based on the Analysis of Incentives and Behaviors of Local Officials

作　　者：王贤彬[1] 黄亮雄 WANG Xianbin;HUANG Liangxiong

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632 [2]华南理工大学经济与金融学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《深圳社会科学》2022年第1期84-95,共12页Social Sciences in Shenzhen

基　　金：国家自然科学基金一般项目“行政审批改革的经济增长效应研究:理论机制、实证识别与政策设计”(71773038);国家自然科学基金一般项目“中国对外直接投资推动全球价值链重构:基于共建‘一带一路’背景的研究”(72073047);广东省自然科学基金一般项目“经济增长目标约束影响公共卫生:理论机制、效应识别与政策优化”(2021A1515011983);广州市哲学社会科学规划项目“RCEP协定影响下广州构建‘双循环’重要战略地位研究”(2021GZYB01)。

摘　　要：当前我国前所未有地重视生态文明建设和环境保护,在全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程中,强调要建设“美丽中国”,本文在此背景下探讨环境治理的微观政治基础。我国政府对生态环境的保护是中央政府所主导的,地方政府特别是地方领导干部是环境保护工作开展中最为关键的微观角色和执行主体。本文从地方干部治理和激励的角度切入,系统地梳理了针对地方政府特别是地方党政领导干部的环保考核制度的演进过程,基于经济学文献从理论和实证两个维度分析地方政府的生态环境保护绩效。首先,本文在文献的基础上阐述了地方干部治理影响环保绩效的理论逻辑,强调了央地关系之下地方政府干部对辖区内环保政策和措施的主导作用。其次,本文从干部的晋升、来源、任期、更替和关系等角度综述了相关文献,全面地反映了在多任务的委托代理关系之下,地方领导干部能动性和策略性地执行中央的环保政策,以完成中央分配的环保任务,最大化本辖区的经济利益和自身的综合效用。这意味着,政府要实现多个维度上的任务目标,实在是一项非常有挑战性的任务。我国的国家治理体系与治理能力现代化建设已经取得巨大进步,但制度建设和能力建设仍需不断推进。中央应当进一步借助法治制度和数字技术等手段,增强对地方领导干部激励和治理的约束力、合理性和精准度,加快建成生态文明社会。At present,China attaches unprecedented importance to the construction of ecological civilization and environmental protection.In the new journey of building a socialist modern country,China also emphasizes the construction of“beautiful China”.Under this background,this paper discusses the micro political basis of environmental governance.The protection of the ecological environment by the Chinese government is dominated by the central government.The local government,especially the local leaders under the leadership of the central government,has become the most critical role and the main body in the development of environmental protection.From the perspective of governance and incentive of local government officials,this paper systematically combs the evolution process of environmental protection assessment system for local governments,especially local party and government leading cadres,and analyzes the ecological environment protection performance of local governments from two dimensions of theory and demonstration based on economic literature.Firstly,based on the literature,this paper expounds the theoretical logic of the impact of local official governance on environmental protection performance,and emphasizes the leading role of local leading officials on environmental protection policies and measures under the central local relationship and within the local government.Secondly,this paper summarizes the relevant economic literature from the perspectives of promotion,source,term of office,replacement and relationship of local officials,and comprehensively reflects how local leading officials can actively and strategically implement the central environmental protection policies to complete the environmental protection tasks assigned by the central government under the multi task principal-agent relationship,Maximize the economic interests of the jurisdiction and its own comprehensive utility.This means that it is a very challenging thing for the government to achieve its tasks and objectives in multiple di

关 键 词：干部激励 环境治理绩效 委托代理关系 政企合谋 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]