应急资源区域协同动员中地方政府合作的博弈研究  

Game Study on Intergovernmental Cooperation in Cross-regional Emergency Resource Mobilization

作　　者：孔昭君 何骁威 KONG Zhaojun;HE Xiaowei(Sustainable Development Research Institute for Economy and Society of Beijing,School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院北京经济社会可持续发展研究基地,北京100081

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第1期121-129,180,共10页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71473015,71841051);北京理工大学军民融合科技协同创新产学研联合研究生培养基地项目(LHPYJD1801);北京市教委共建项目专项。

摘　　要：区域协同动员是当前及未来中国国民经济动员工作的重要内容,地方政府合作在区域协同动员中发挥着非常重要的作用。在分析应急资源区域协同动员特征基础上,分析地方政府间合作的协调博弈模型的选择问题;研究仅有两个地方政府参与时,跨区域应急资源动员中政府间合作的关键要素和动力条件;构建跨区域政府间合作的对称协调博弈结构模型,分析在无约束机制以及有约束机制条件下,地方政府间的合作选择策略。认为:影响地方政府间开展合作的三个重要因素:一是地方政府选择合作带来的净收益;二是中央(上级)政府的影响;三是地方政府间的合作基础。Cooperation among local governments is greatly instrumental in cross-regional synergy that is integral to China’s national economic mobilization efforts at present and in the future.Based on the analysis of the characteristics of cross-regional synergy mobilization in emergency resources,this paper dives into the choice of a coordination game model for cooperation among local governments,and studies the key elements and dynamic conditions of inter-governmental cooperation in the process of cross-regional emergency resource synergy when only two local governments are involved.In addition,a symmetric coordination game model has been built to analyze the selection strategy for cooperation between local governments under the conditions of unconstrained and restricted mechanisms.In this paper,three important factors that affect cooperation among local governments are concluded:the net benefits produced by local governments’choice of cooperation,the influence of the central(superior)government,and the basis for cooperation among local governments.

关 键 词：应急资源动员 区域协同 对称协调博弈 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学] F224.32[政治法律—中外政治制度]