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作 者:皮建才[1] 李淑宁 PI Jian-cai;LI Shu-ning
机构地区:[1]南京大学经济学院
出 处:《中央财经大学学报》2022年第1期89-98,共10页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基 金:江苏省第五期“333工程”科研资助项目“体制性产能过剩的机制、测度和对策研究”(项目编号:BRA2019041)。
摘 要:本文通过建立博弈论模型,在垂直结构下分析了上游垄断国有企业的管理授权对下游古诺竞争的民营企业的产能过剩和体制性产能过剩产生的影响。研究结果表明:(1)在垂直结构中,当上游国有企业对经理人实行管理授权时,经理人的产量激励越强,下游民营企业的产能过剩越严重;反之,产能过剩就越轻微。(2)考虑地方政府对当地民营企业进行补贴,国有企业对经理人的产量激励越强,体制性产能过剩就越严重;反之,体制性产能过剩就越轻微。(3)垂直结构中的管理授权是一种有效的市场组织形式,有助于化解产能过剩并提升整体社会福利。上游国有企业的管理授权不仅仅是上游国有企业自身的事情,它还会影响到下游民营企业的产能过剩和体制性产能过剩。Through building game theoretical models, this paper analyzes how managerial delegation in the upstream state-owned enterprise affects overcapacity and institutional overcapacity in downstream private firms under the vertical structure.The main findings are as follows.First, under the vertical structure, when the upstream state-owned enterprise adopts managerial delegation, if the managerial quantity incentive of the state-owned enterprise becomes stronger(respectively weaker),overcapacity in downstream private firms will be more severe(respectively slight).Second, considering that local governments subsidize local private firms, if the managerial quantity incentive of the state-owned enterprise becomes stronger(respectively weaker),institutional overcapacity in private firms will be more severe(respectively slight).Third, managerial delegation under the vertical structure is an effective market organizational form to reduce overcapacity and improve social welfare.Managerial delegation in the upstream state-owned enterprise is not only an individual thing, it can influence overcapacity and institutional overcapacity in downstream private firms.
分 类 号:F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]
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