基于政府调控的节能环保产业间供应链企业协同创新演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Study of Supply Chain Enterprise Collaborative Innovation in Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Industry Based on Government Regulation

作　　者：李婷 周艳军[2] LI Ting;ZHOU Yan-jun(College of Engineering Shanghai Polytechnic University,Shanghai 201209;School of Economics&Management,Shanghai Polytechnic University,Shanghai 201209,China)

机构地区：[1]上海第二工业大学工学部,上海201209 [2]上海第二工业大学经济管理学院,上海201209

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2021年第12期106-111,共6页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：为优化节能环保产业政策调控,强化企业协同创新,在基于节能环保产业的四大特性及供应链企业追求经济效益与社会效益的均衡发展上,构建考虑节能环保产业特征和外部政策政府因素下供应链上下游企业间的演化博弈模型,考虑了企业内外部收益等多种因素的影响,并通过MATLAB对影响因素进行数值仿真。结果表明:政府补贴及奖励、惩罚机制对企业协同创新具有激励作用;成本补贴与成本奖励相结合更加有效;与追求经济效益最大化相比,追求经济与社会效益均衡发展的供应链企业协同创新对政府政策要求更高。In order to optimize the policy regulation of energy conserration and environmental protection industry and strengthen the cooperative innovation of enterprises,based on the four characteristics of energy conserration and environmental protection industry and the balanced development of supply chain enterprises in pursuit of economic and social benefits,an evolutionary game model between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain is built,taking into account the internal and external benefits of enterprises,and the numerical simulation of the influencing factors through MATLAB is carried out.The results show that the government subsidy and the incentive and punishment mechanism have an incentive effect on the collaborative innovation of enterprises;the combination of cost subsidy and cost incentive is more effective;compared with the pursuit of maximizing economic benefits,the collaborative innovation of supply chain enterprises pursuing balanced development of economic and social benefits requires more government policies.

关 键 词：政府调控 节能环保产业 供应链 协同创新 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]