全过程工程咨询推进主体行为研究  

Research on the Behavior of the Whole Process Engineering Consulting Promotion Subject

作　　者：桑培东[1] 许玲齐 SANG Peidong;XU Lingqi(School of Management Engineering,Shandong Jianzhu University,Jinan 250101,China)

机构地区：[1]山东建筑大学管理工程学院,山东济南250101

出　　处：《工程经济》2021年第12期76-80,共5页ENGINEERING ECONOMY

摘　　要：基于演化博弈理论,构建政府、全过程工程咨询开展企业和业主三方演化博弈模型,分析三方的演化稳定策略,并利用Matlab对不同影响因素下三方的动态博弈演化路径进行仿真分析。结果表明:推进初期,政府的强激励及企业、业主的积极参与十分重要,合理的财政补贴、项目收益和较小的风险成本是推进政府强激励、企业开展和业主采纳的重要途径。Based on the evolutionary game theory,the paper constructs the evolutionary game model of the government,the whole process engineering consulting enterprise and owner,analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the three parties,and simulates the evolutionary path of the three parties under different influencing factors by MATLAB.The results indicate thatin the early stage of the promotion,the government's strong incentive and the active participation of enterprises and owners are very important.Reasonable financial subsidies,project income and low risk cost are important ways to promote strong government incentives,enterprise development and owner adoption.

关 键 词：全过程工程咨询 协同推进 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：TU71[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]