投资银行-审计师业务关联与IPO盈余管理  

The Underwriter-Auditor Connections and Earnings Management During IPOs

作　　者：龚启辉[1,2,3] 李辰 吴联生 Gong Qihui

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,310058 [2]上海纽约大学,200122 [3]北京大学光华管理学院,100871

出　　处：《会计研究》2021年第9期106-119,共14页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71602171,71932001)资助。

摘　　要：近年来国内外审计研究倍加重视在审计师个人层面展开研究,而这在我国关系型社会的背景下尤显重要。审计师与金融中介机构存在诸多利益联结,但已有研究鲜有涉及这一经济利益关系如何影响注册会计师行为。我们研究IPO过程中投资银行与审计师由重复合作形成的业务关联并发现,投资银行-审计师在签字注册会计师个人层面的业务关联提高了IPO正向盈余管理水平,而投资银行-审计师在会计师事务所层面的关联则不会提高甚至降低了IPO正向盈余管理水平;上述结果在投资银行风险控制评级较低、审计师规模较小、审计任期较短以及客户业务较为复杂时更为明显。同时,投资银行与会计师的业务关联既能够提高投资银行的收费,也能够提高审计收费,表明为了获得更多的收费可能是注册会计师与投资银行进行合谋而配合IPO盈余管理的重要原因。Recent auditing literature has shifted its focus to the partner-level studies.This shift is of greater importance in a relation-based economy like China.Auditors and financial intermediaries develop various connections of mutual benefits, but there is little research on the impact of such connections on CPA’s behaviors.We study the underwriter-auditor relationship(UAR)developed from previous collaboration in IPO business and find that, the CPA-level UAR increases the positive earnings management of IPO firms, but the accounting firm-level UAR does not.Such differential effects are more significant when the underwriters receive lower ratings of risk control, when the accounting firms are smaller, when the auditors’ tenures are shorter, and when the issuers’ business is more complex.In addition, we find that the UAR is associated with higher underwriters’ service fees and higher audit fees, indicating that the extra revenue may motivate the underwriters and auditors to collude on IPO earnings management.

关 键 词：投资银行 审计师 盈余管理 业务关联 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F275