农村社区治理中的经济能人与利益博弈——基于安徽省L村建设实况的考察  被引量:2

Economic Elites and Interest Game in Rural Community Governance: Based on Factual Investigation of L Village’s Construction in Anhui Province

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作  者:李金红[1] 孙涛 LI Jinhong;SUN Tao

机构地区:[1]江汉大学法学院,湖北武汉430056

出  处:《江汉大学学报(社会科学版)》2022年第1期40-50,126,共12页Journal of Jianghan University(Social Science Edition)

基  金:国家社科基金一般项目“基层党建引领乡村自治、法治、德治的融合模式研究”(21BZZ024)。

摘  要:新时代推进农村社区治理建设成为社会治理的共识。村集体组织和经济能人作为博弈参与人是农村社区治理出现冲突的关键点,促进农村社区治理建设需要村集体组织和经济能人达成纳什均衡状态。分析村集体组织和经济能人的经济利益效用与政治权威利益效用博弈,通过帕累托改进,厘清村集体组织和经济能人的博弈行为动向,促成村集体组织和经济能人达成最优组合,推动具有纳什均衡文化的农村社区共同体治理建设。研究发现,"能人治村"现象是由能人与村集体组织博弈达到均衡状态的结果,这也是博弈参与人合作实现效用合理分割的表征,故而在农村社区治理建设中需要注重发挥"能人治村"模式的作用。To promote the governance and construction of rural communities in the new era has become a consensus.Village collective organizations and economic elites,as the gaming participants,are the key factors for the conflict in rural community governance.To enhance the governance and construction of rural communities,it is necessary for village collective organizations and economic elites to reach the state of Nash equilibrium.An analysis of the economic interest utility and the political authority interest utility game between village collective organizations and economic elites,through Pareto improvement,the game behavior and tendency of village collective organizations and economic elites can be clarified,which can help village collective organizations and economic elites to achieve the optimal combination,and propel the governance and construction of a rural community featuring the Nash equilibrium culture.The research discovers that when the gaming between elites and village collective organization reaches a balanced state,there exists the phenomenon of"elites governing the villages",which is a manifestation of gaming participants’cooperation to achieve a reasonable segmentation of utility.Hence,attention should be paid to the function of the"elites governing the villages"model in rural community governance and construction.

关 键 词:农村社区治理 村集体组织 经济能人 利益博弈 帕累托改进 

分 类 号:C916[经济管理]

 

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