产权单位管理模式下的老旧小区物业管理对策研究  

Research on the Countermeasures of Property Management in OldCommunities under the Management Mode of Property Ownership Units

作　　者：张国宗 罗千买 范栩侨 孙原 ZHANG Guo-zong;LUO Qian-mai;FANXu-qiao;SUN Yuan(School of Urban Economics and Management,Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Beijing 102616,China)

机构地区：[1]北京建筑大学城市经济与管理学院,北京102616

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2021年第6期149-154,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：住房和城乡建设部软科学研究项目(UDC2020020822);住房和城乡建设部软科学研究项目(2021-R-031).

摘　　要：城市老旧小区物业管理的良性发展应该协调多元主体间的关系和利益。构建地方政府、产权单位和居民群体三方演化博弈模型,求解相关利益主体行为变化的影响因素,揭示老旧小区物业管理行为主体达到良性互动的形成机制。研究结果表明,政府的补贴、监管惩罚、产生的城市整体效益、政府付出的成本、产权单位的企业形象、产权单位的管理成本、企业形象损失、居民群体选择违背合约,拖欠缴费策略带来的额外收益和定期缴纳的物业费等是影响三方主体协作配合的关键因素;在不同的成本和收益关系下,各参与主体初始意愿比例、政府补贴和监管惩罚均会对演化结果产生影响。The healthy development of property management in old urban communities should coordinate the relationship andinterests in multiple agents.This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government,property rights units andresidents groups.Based on the game model,the influencing factors of changes in the behavior of related stakeholders are explored.Then,the formation mechanism of the benign interactions between the property management actors in old communities is revealed.The research results show some vital factors affecting the cooperation of the three parties,including government subsidies,regulatorypenalties,overall city benefits,costs paid by the government,corporate image of property rights units,management costs of propertyrights units,loss of corporate image,additional investment income for residents,and regular payment of property fees.Underdifferent cost and benefit relationships,the initial willingness ratio of each participant,government subsidies,and regulatorypenalties will all affect the evolutionary results.

关 键 词：演化博弈 产权单位 老旧小区 物业管理 

分 类 号：F293.3[经济管理—国民经济]