存款保险制度下中小银行道德风险及其防范研究--以J省A市为例  

Research on Moral Hazard and Prevention of Small and Medium-sized Banks under the Deposit Insurance System--Take City A in Province J as an Example

作　　者：倪培元[1] 李娜[1] NI Peiyuan;LI Na

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行通化市中心支行,吉林通化134001

出　　处：《吉林金融研究》2021年第11期31-34,共4页Journal of Jilin Financial Research

摘　　要：大量中小商业银行是金融体制改革中的关键一环,2015年国家开始实施存款保险制度后,中小银行成为该制度最主要的受益者,然而被纳入存款保险制度后,部分机构在风险防控、规范经营上有所放松,存在道德风险倾向。本文以中小商业银行的角度,以J省A市为例,探寻存款保险制度运行过程中道德风险产生的原因,进而从不同的角度探索如何防范。A large number of small and medium-sized commercial banks are a key part of the fi nancial system reform.After the country began to implement the deposit insurance system in 2015,small and medium-sized banks became the main benefi ciaries of the system.However,after being included in the deposit insurance system,some institutions are The control and standardization of operations have been relaxed,and there is a moral hazard inclination.From the perspective of small and medium commercial banks,this article takes J province A city as an example to explore the causes of moral hazard during the operation of the deposit insurance system,and then explore how to prevent it from diff erent perspectives.

关 键 词：存款保险制度 道德风险防范 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]