负面清单管理模式下的内外资企业投资博弈分析  

Investment Game Analysis of Domestic and Foreign Enterprises Under Negative List Management Mode

作　　者：罗舟 王耀中[1] Luo Zhou;Wang Yaozhong

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410076

出　　处：《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第1期21-27,152,153,共9页Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）

摘　　要：准入前国民待遇加负面清单的管理模式是我国自贸试验区外资管理制度的核心。利用期权博弈理论,结合我国自贸试验区的外资管理现状构建外企拥有在母国投资和东道国投资两种投资方式的不对称双寡头投资博弈模型,并首先解出追随者和领导者的价值函数和最优投资临界值,然后对不同情况下均衡的成立条件与投资策略进行了详细探讨,最后进一步深入分析了各参数对各最优价值转换点的影响,并基于分析结果给出对策建议。The management model of pre-establishment national treatment(PENT)with a negative list is the core of foreign capital management system in China’s pilot free trade zone.Under this background,this paper uses the option game theory combined with the current situation of foreign capital management in China’s pilot free trade zone to construct an asymmetric duopoly investment game model in which foreign enterprises have two investment modes:home country investment and host country investment.First,the value function and optimal investment threshold of the follower and the leader are solved.Then,the conditions of equilibrium in different situations are discussed in detail.Finally,the influence of each parameter on each optimal value conversion point is further analyzed,and based on the analysis results,thus countermeasures and suggestions are given from the two levels of enterprise and government.

关 键 词：负面清单 自贸试验区 期权博弈理论 均衡 

分 类 号：F202[经济管理—国民经济]