零售业通道费模式转型:现象、动因和趋势  

The Transition of Slotting Allowance Mode:Facts,Mechanism and Tendency

作　　者：王庚 庄尚文 孙治宇[1] WANG Geng;ZHUANG Shang-wen;SUN Zhi-yu(School of Economics,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 410205,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学经济学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《消费经济》2021年第6期40-49,共10页Consumer Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(17BJL076);江苏省高校哲学社会科学重大项目(2020SJZDA051)。

摘　　要：在把握零售业既有盈利模式核心要素的基础上,建立了一个"生产商—零售商—消费者"的渠道博弈模型。均衡分析表明,较之传统盈利模式(即买断模式),"通道费模式"是一种纯粹损人利己的机制设计,它挤占了生产商利润,提高了价格水平,降低了社会总福利。零售商会基于自身的渠道权力、运营能力和商品属性选择是否采取该盈利模式,"通道费模式"的固化是"渠道为王"市场环境下,零售企业基于自身较大渠道权力和较低的运营能力理性选择的结果。但在电子商务的冲击以及在新冠肺炎疫情的影响下,零售商丧失渠道权力已成定局,而零售商的运营能力却随着技术进步潜移默化地提升,"通道费模式"存在的经济基础已经动摇,回归传统零售已是大势所趋。在这种情况下,政府应调整规制思路,鼓励和引导零售业盈利模式的转型。This paper builds a game model of business system based on the consideration of core features of retail enterprises and current profit mode.The equilibrium analysis shows that compare to traditional profit mode,“slotting allowance mode”is a self-serving mechanism,which harms the interests of producers and consumers and brings down social welfare.Nevertheless,this profit mode is just an impermanent choice of retailers under particular market power,operation ability and commodity character.Particularly,the popularization of slotting allowance is a consequence of market environment under which the distribution channel is most important.However,under the impact of Internet economy and COVID-19,the economic foundation of“slotting allowance mode”has wavered because of the loss of market power and the gradual enhancement of operation ability,which makes the traditional profit mode gain renewed vitality.Under this circumstance,the government should change regulation strategy and concentrate on the guidance of retail transition.

关 键 词：零售业 通道费模式 转型机理 福利效应 

分 类 号：F710[经济管理—产业经济]